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      The Chevron Two-Step in Georgia’s Administrative Law 
     David E. Shipley 
 The Georgia Supreme Court and Court of Appeals have long accepted the General 
Assembly’s authority to enact legislation that establishes administrative agencies and 
empowers those agencies to promulgate rules and regulations to implement their enabling 
statutes.1 In addition, the Georgia Constitution provides that the General Assembly may 
authorize agencies to exercise quasi-judicial powers.2 Administrative agencies with broad 
powers enjoy a secure position under Georgia law.3 
Like federal and state administrative agencies throughout the nation, Georgia’s 
many boards, commissions and authorities make policy when they apply their governing 
statutes in promulgating regulations of general applicability,4 and in ruling on specific 
matters like granting or denying an application for a permit or determining the residency 
of a candidate for public office.5 Sometimes the governing statutes are clear, but 
sometimes there is ambiguity. When there is ambiguity in its governing statute, the 
agency must interpret that legislation when it promulgates regulations or decides a 
particular contested matter.6 This article asks and answers the question of what deference, 
                                                          
1 David Shipley, The Status of Agencies Under the Georgia Constitution, 40 Ga. L. Rev. 1109, 1128 
(2006). 
2 Ga. Const. art.VI, § 1, ¶ 1. ‘The judicial power of the state shall be vested exclusively in the following 
classes of courts: … In addition, the General Assembly may establish or authorize the establishment of 
municipal courts and may authorize administrative agencies to exercise quasi-judicial powers.’ See also 
Shipley, supra note 1, at 1152 (discussing Ga. Const. art. VI, § 1, ¶ 1). 
 3 Shipley, supra note 1, at 1170. 
4 The Georgia Administrative Procedure Act sets out the process for promulgating regulations. OCGA § 
50-13-4. 
5 See, e.g., Center for a Sustainable Coast v. Coastal Marshlands Prot. Comm., 670 S.E.2d 429 (Ga. 
2008)(involving environmental group’s challenge to permit granted to a developer by the Coastal 
Marshlands Protection Committee); Handel v. Powell, 670 S.E.2d  62  (Ga. 2008)(involving dispute over 
Secretary of State’s determination of residence of a candidate for election to the Public Service 
Commission). The Administrative Procedure Act also sets forth procedures for the adjudication of 
contested cases. OCGA §§ 50-13-13 to 18 (2009). 
6 Michael Asimow & Ronald Levin, STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 519 (3d ed. 2009). 
 2
if any, must a Georgia court afford to an agency’s interpretation of its governing statute 
when it reviews an agency’s decision in a contested case or considers a challenge to the 
validity or applicability of an agency’s regulation.   
The issue of appropriate deference is a fundamental administrative law question 
for federal and state courts because it concerns the allocation of authority over the 
interpretation of statutes and policy-making between agencies and the judiciary.7 
Legislatures establish agencies in part because our elected representatives recognize that 
some issues are too complex for them deal with on a day-to-day basis and/or require 
expertise that they do not have and cannot acquire.8 The basic authority of state and 
federal agencies to carry out their delegated duties is rarely questioned. However, when 
agencies interpret and apply their governing statutes they are making policy and arguably 
making law, especially when they are filling gaps or resolving ambiguities left in those 
governing statutes by the legislative branch.9 This is the source of the deference debate 
because our nation’s creed has long been, according to Marbury v. Madison,10  that courts 
decide questions of law.11 Accordingly, the question of whether a court should defer to an 
agency’s interpretation of its governing statute implicates the judiciary’s role in deciding 
questions of law and policy-making. This “is one of the most complex aspects of 
                                                          
7 William R. Anderson, Chevron in the States: An Assessment and a Proposal, 58 Admin. L. Rev. 1017, 
1017 (2006). Cf. Thomas Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental Landmark, in 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 399 (Peter Strauss, ed., 2006); William Fox, Understanding Administrative 
Law 313-14 (5th edition 2008). 
8 See, e.g., Georgia Real Estate Commission v. Accelerated Courses in Real Estate, 214 S.E.2d 495, 500 
(Ga. 1975); Bentley v. Chastain, 249 S.E.2d 38, 40-41 (Ga. 1978); Department of Community Health v. 
Gwinnett Hospital System, 586 S.E.2d 762, 765 (Ga. App. 2004). Each of these cases explains why the 
General Assembly establishes administrative agencies.   
9 William McGrath et al., Project: State Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 43 Admin. L. Rev. 571, 
759 (1991).  
10 See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and the duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is.”). 
11 Id. at 177-78; see also Anderson, supra note 7, at 1017. 
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administrative law,”12 and the most frequently cited and analyzed U.S. Supreme Court 
decision dealing with administrative law, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.13 concerns this question.14  
In Chevron the U.S. Supreme Court established a two-step analysis for judicial 
review of “an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers.”15 The Court did 
most of this in a relatively simple paragraph: 
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it 
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question 
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent 
of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the 
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, 
however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise 
question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the 
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. 
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the 
question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.16 
This is a very deferential standard because in deciding whether to affirm the agency 
“[t]he court need not conclude that the agency construction was the only one it 
                                                          
12 Charles Koch, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE, VOL. 3, § 12.31, p. 235 (2d ed. 1997): McGrath, 
supra note 9, at 759 (this is a confusing and controversial area). 
13 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
14 Merrill, The Story of Chevron, supra note 7, at 399 & note 2. In addition, it “has generated an enormous 
volume of critical literature in the . . . years since its formulation.” Anderson, supra note 7, at 1018. 
“[F]orests have been laid waste to publish the outpouring of legal commentary on [Chevron] and its 
progeny.” Jerry Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry Into 
Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 Admin. L. Rev. 501 (2005). 
15 467 U.S. at 842. 
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permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction, or even the reading the court 
would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding.”17 The 
reviewing court “may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a 
reasonable interpretation made by the . . . agency.”18 Instead, the court must defer and 
affirm if the agency’s construction of its ambiguous statute is reasonable.19  
Chevron is, of course, a federal decision that does not bind any state’s courts in 
how they review rulings from that state’s agencies.20  Some scholars have concluded that 
there are three general approaches to answering or resolving the deference issue.21 The 
court can defer by accepting the agency’s interpretation if it is reasonable even though the 
court might have interpreted the statute differently. This is strong deference as in 
Chevron. The opposite approach is for the court to give no weight or deference to the 
agency’s interpretation and resolve the issue on its own.  The third general approach falls 
in between, with the court affording deference to the agency but retaining authority to 
substitute its judgment for the agency.22 One scholar states that “[m]ost state courts 
exercise independent judgment when reviewing any agency interpretation of the law.23 
There are many decisions by Georgia’s appellate courts discussing judicial 
deference to agency interpretations of the statutes they administer and enforce. In 2008 
alone the Georgia Supreme Court announced four rulings in which the issue of deference 
                                                                                                                                                                             
16 Id. at 842-43 (footnotes omitted). 
17 Id. at 843 n.11. This is strong deference. Asimow & Levin, supra note 6, at 532 n.2.  
18 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
19 McGrath, supra note 9, at 761 (a court cannot reverse an agency because it believes a different result is 
preferable); Fox, supra note 7, at 315. 
20  McGrath, supra note 9, at 763 (pointing out that each state has developed its own scope of review 
standards); Asimow & Levin, supra note 6, at 538 n.7 (explaining that a few states have adopted Chevron 
but most have not). There are, however, questions about the U.S. Supreme Court’s consistency in applying 
Chevron. Fox, supra note 7, at 316.,  
21 Asimow & Levin, supra note 6 , at 519-20; ). See also McGrath, supra note 9, at 763; Koch, supra note 
12, at 285-86.. 
22 Asimow & Levin, supra note 6 , at 519-20; ). See also McGrath, supra note 9, at 763. 
 5
was paramount.24 These relatively recent decisions, consistent with earlier Georgia 
jurisprudence on judicial deference, confirm that Georgia is a strong deference state 
where the “courts will defer to the agency interpretation as long as it is not contrary to the 
statute.”25 This article analyzes those 2008 decisions along with many other Georgia 
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals opinions in which there was a question of whether 
there should be deference to an agency’s interpretation of its governing statute. The 
article’s thesis is that Georgia’s appellate courts have adopted and follow an approach 
that is similar to the famous Chevron two-step.26   
It is important to acknowledge that Georgia’s appellate courts have said that 
“[j]udicial review of an administrative decision is a two-step process.”27  The steps are as 
follows; the reviewing court first determines whether there is sufficient evidence to 
support the agency’s finding of fact and then, second, examines the soundness of the 
agency’s conclusions of law.28 The focus of this article and its thesis about judicial 
deference concerns what the courts do on that second step when they review the agency’s 
interpretation of its governing statute; as stated in Chevron, how the appellate courts 
                                                                                                                                                                             
23 Koch, supra note 12, at 285.  
24 See Georgia Dept. of Revenue v. Owens Corning, 660 S.E.2d 719 (Ga. 2008); Pruitt Corp. v. Georgia 
Dept. of Community Health, 664 S.E.2d 223 (Ga. 2008); Handel v. Powell, 670 S.E.2d 62 (Ga. 2008); 
Center for a Sustainable Coast v. Coastal Marshlands Prot. Comm. 670 S.E.2d 429 (Ga. 2008). 
25 Michael Pappas, No Two-Stepping in the Laboratories: State Deference Standards and Their 
Implications for Improving the Chevron Doctrine, 39 McGeorge L. Rev. 977, 985, 985 n.28 & 1013 
(2008). See also McGrath, supra note 9, at 763 & n.257. Strong deference is sometimes referred to as high 
deference. 
26 “Chevron is by far the most prominent federal case on judicial review of agencies’ statutory 
interpretations.” The Court’s two-step inquiry prescribes a strong deference. In essence, if the reviewing 
court determines that the governing statute is ambiguous, and that the agency’s interpretation is reasonable, 
deference is mandatory. Asimow & Levin, supra note 6, at 531 n.1 & 532 n.2. 
27 Handel v. Powell, 670 S.E.2d 62, 65 (2008); Pruitt Corp. v. Georgia Department of Community Health, 
664 S.E.2d 223 (2008); Lamar Co. v. Whiteway Neon-Ad, 693 S.E.2d 848, 851 (Ga. App. 2010); Northeast 
Georgia Medical Center v. Winder HMA, Inc., 693 S.E.2d 110, 114 (Ga. App. 2010).  
28 Pruitt Corp. v. Georgia Dept. of Community Health, 664 S.E.2d 223, 226 (2008). 
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review “an agency’s construction of statute which it administers.”29 Georgia courts have 
not acknowledged the influential Chevron decision in their opinions even though their 
approach to the issue parallels the Chevron two-step approach. This might be explained 
by the fact that Georgia’s strong deference jurisprudence pre-dates Chevron by many 
years.30 
More particularly, the decisions discussed in this article show that Georgia’s 
appellate courts, like their federal counterparts, have used “traditional tools of statutory 
construction”31 in analyzing and applying what is called Chevron step one; determining 
whether the General Assembly (Congress) has directly addressed the question at issue. 
The tools used by Georgia’s courts include those used by the federal courts: canons and 
principles of statutory interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutes and legislative 
intent, examining the text of the legislation, closely reading dictionary definitions, and 
weighing available legislative history.32   
Like the federal courts, Georgia’s appellate courts also use these tools on the 
second step; deciding whether or not the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.33 
Moreover, as with the many federal cases applying Chevron, the Georgia decisions show 
                                                          
29 467 U.S. at 842. 
30 Chevron is mentioned and cited in only two reported Georgia Court of Appeals decisions that are not 
directly on point. See  Georgia Dept. of Revenue v. Chemistry Council, Inc., 607 S.E.2d 207, 208-09 & n.7  
(Ga. App. 2005)(citing Chevron for policies behind deference, not the test); Schneider v. Susquehanna 
Radio Corp., 581 S.E.2d 603, 606 & n.10 (Ga. App. 2003)(applying Chevron briefly to federal Consumer 
Protection Act). According to one scholar, no state expressly adopts the Chevron two step and that strong 
deference states often go with a one-step reasonableness review. Pappas, supra note 25, at 986. On the 
other hand, Professors Michael Asimow and Ronald Levin state that a “few state courts have adopted the 
Chevron test for use in evaluating the actions of state agencies.” Asimow & Levin, supra note 6, at 538 n.7 
(this note also references several articles dealing with the pros and cons of recognizing Chevron in 
particular states (Texas and California) and in the states generally). It is relevant to note that the U.S. 
Supreme Court itself has struck down an agency’s interpretation of its own statute without citing Chevron. 
See Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. A.T. & S.F. RR. Co., 516 U.S. 152 (1996);  Fox, supra note 
7, at 315.  
31 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9. 
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that a litigant’s chances of success often turn on how the first step is resolved. If the 
reviewing court determines that the governing statute is ambiguous or does not address 
the issue, then it will defer to the agency’s reasonable interpretation. This standard 
affords considerable weight to the agency’s determination. On the other hand, if the 
appellate court determines that the governing statute is clear, it will then say exactly what 
the statute means and often conclude that the agency’s interpretation is contrary to the 
statute or the clear intent of the General Assembly.34 
This article first discusses the federal approach to judicial deference, including the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision United States v. Mead Corp.35 that imposed limits on the 
sweep of Chevron deference and resurrected the venerable Skidmore36 decision with its 
totality of the circumstances approach to deference.  It then provides a thorough analysis 
of Georgia’s jurisprudence on deference to agency interpretations of their governing 
statutes, focusing especially on four 2008 decisions by the Georgia Supreme Court. 
Third, this article presents a synthesis of what comes out of these Georgia appellate 
decisions dealing with judicial deference.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
32 ABA Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice (Michael Herz), A Blackletter Statement of 
Federal Administrative Law, 54  Admin. L. Rev. 1, 37 (2002). 
33 Asimow & Levin, supra note 6, at 536-37 note 5. 
34 The issue for resolution on the second step, whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable, is where 
the deference comes into play. A study of how the EPA fared in the U.S. Courts of Appeals showed that it 
lost 59% of the time on Step One, but that the agency won 92% of the time when it got beyond the first 
step. Christopher Schroeder & Robert Glicksman, Chevron, State Farm, and the EPA in the Courts of 
Appeals During the 1990s, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. 10,371, 10,375-77 (2001). Another study  of 223 published 
U.S. Court of Appeals decisions between 1995 and 96, 38% were resolved on Step 1 with 58% being 
reversals, and 62% were decided on Step 2, with only 11% of being reversals. Orin Kerr, Shedding Light on 
Chevron: An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of appeals, 15 Yale J. on Reg. 1, 
30-31 (1998). There is uncertainty about how step two is meant to work. Asimow & Levin, supra note 6, at 
536 n.5. 
35 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
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I.  The Federal Approach: Chevron, Mead and Skidmore 
     The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National 
Resources Defense Council, Inc.37 has been described as the “most important decision 
about the most important issue in modern administrative law – the allocation of power 
between courts and agencies ‘to say what the law is.’”38 As noted in this article’s 
introduction, the Court established a two-step analysis for judicial review of “an agency’s 
construction of statute which it administers.”39  This “two-step framework . . . has taken 
the judicial world by storm.”40   
Chevron involved a challenge to regulations promulgated by the Environmental 
Protection Agency in 1981 to implement permit requirements under the Clear Air Act.41  
These regulations allowed a State to adopt a plant-wide definition of the statutory term 
‘stationary source.’ This definition would allow an existing facility with several pollution 
emitting sources like smoke stacks to install a new furnace or modify a stack without 
going through the permitting process so long as the total emissions from the entire facility 
were not increased by the additions or modifications.42 A facility with all of its smoke 
stacks was treated as being in under a bubble. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
36 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
37 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
38 Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards, 54 
Admin. L. Rev. 807, 809 (2002). As noted previously, it is the most frequently cited case in administrative 
law. Merrill, The Story of Chevron, supra note 7, at 399. See also Asimow & Levin, supra note  6, at 531 
(Chevron is “the most prominent federal case on judicial review of agencies’ statutory  interpretations … it 
is a landmark decision”). 
39 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842; see supra notes 11 to 17 and accompanying text. 
40 Merrill, The Story of Chevron, supra note 7, at 399. 
41 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840. Fox, supra note  7, at 314. 
42 467 U.S. at 840. 
 9
regulation was invalid but the Supreme Court ultimately reversed, holding that the EPA’s 
construction of ‘stationary source’ was permissible.43     
The Court reached this conclusion after describing and going through a two-step 
process.44 Step one requires the reviewing court to scrutinize what the statute says and 
determine “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue” 
because, if it has, the court and the agency “must give effect to the unambiguously 
expressed intent” of the legislature.45 The Court emphasized in a footnote that the 
judiciary has the last word on statutory construction and that agency interpretations 
contrary to clear congressional intent have to be rejected. It also instructed courts to 
ascertain whether Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue by 
“employing traditional tools of statutory construction.”46 The Supreme Court did not list 
those traditional tools.47 However, in finding that Congress did not have an intent 
regarding the term “stationary source” and the applicability of the bubble concept to the 
permit program, and concluding that the EPA’s use of the bubble concept was a 
reasonable policy choice, the Court closely examined the applicable legislation and its 
legislative history.48   
The step one inquiry leaves a great deal of judgment to the reviewing court. Some 
courts take a perfunctory look at the governing statute and others engage in a much more 
                                                          
43 467 U.S. at 841 & 866. There is a tremendous volume of scholarly commentary on Chevron that will not 
be summarized in this article. See Asimow & Levin, supra note 6, at 533 n.3 (the number of law review 
articles on the case is ‘voluminous’).  
44 467 U.S. at 842-66. 
45 Id. at 842-43. Although Chevron involved a challenge to agency rulemaking. it has been accepted as 
applying as well to adjudication. McGrath, supra note 9, at 761. 
46 467 U.S. at 843 n. 9.  
47 Step one does not dictate that courts use a particular method of statutory interpretation. A Blackletter 
Statement of Federal Administrative Law, supra note 32, at 37. 
48 467 U.S. at 845-48.     
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searching analysis.49 Moreover, it is relatively common to see the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
justices disagreeing vigorously on whether a statute and/or congressional intent is clear 
and whether strong deference is appropriate.50 “[A]ll the nuances of Chevron have not yet 
been explored.”51 
  Step one recognizes the primacy of the legislative branch by holding 
“unambiguously expressed” congressional intent “must be given effect.” However, if the 
reviewing court concludes after the step one inquiry that the statute is ambiguous on the 
issue presented, then Chevron places lawmaking primacy in the agency; specifically, the 
agency’s interpretation is to be upheld if it is reasonable.52 This is a very deferential 
standard53 because “[t]he court need not conclude that the agency construction was the 
only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction, or even the 
reading the court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial 
proceeding.”54 In other words, the agency’s construction only needs to be reasonable. 
                                                          
49 Asimow & Levin, supra note 6, at 534-35, note 4. 
50 See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 422, 443 (1987)(holding 6-3 no deference to the INS); 
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 219, 229 (1984)(holding 6-3 no deference to  
FCC because its interpretation went beyond meaning that statute could bear); Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 
517 U.S. 392, 413-14 (1996)(O’Connor, J, dissenting - discussing whether certain categories of workers in 
poultry business came within the “on the farm” exclusion from the NLRA’s coverage); FDA v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 191-92 (2000)(Breyer, J., dissenting - disagreeing with the 
majority’s assertion that statutes had deprived  the Food & Drug Administration of  jurisdiction to regulate 
tobacco ); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 594-95 (2000)(Stevens, J., dissenting - according 
deference to Department of Labor opinion letters and guidance documents pertaining to the Fair Labor 
Standards Act to which the majority gave none); Carcieri v. Salazar, 129 S. Ct. 1058, 1060-61, 1066 
(2009)(holding 6-3 that Secretary of the Interior could not take land into trust for  a tribe not recognized in 
1934 when  Indian Reorganization Act was passed – term ‘now’ in the statute is not ambiguous); Talk 
America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 564 U.S. __ (2011)(deference to an agency’s interpretation 
of its regulations, even in a legal brief, with Scalia, concurring, agreeing that the interpretation was 
reasonable but questioning the wisdom of deference to such interpretations).  
51 Fox, supra note 7, at 317.  
52 Michael Healy, Spurious Interpretation Redux: Mead and the Shrinking Domain of Statutory Ambiguity, 
54 Admin. Law Rev. 673, 675 n.6 (2002). 
53 Asimow & Levin, supra note 6, at 532 n.2 (decision prescribes strong deference – if agency’s 
interpretation is reasonable, deference is mandatory). 
54 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.11. 
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“[A] court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a 
reasonable interpretation made by the … agency.”55 
 The Supreme Court explained that this strong deference to the agency’s 
interpretation was justified because of the authority explicitly and implicitly delegated to 
agencies by the legislative branch.  
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express 
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the 
statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight 
unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. 
Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is 
implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own 
construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the 
administrator of an agency.56  
The Supreme Court also explained that it was appropriate for agencies to make 
difficult policy choices because of their accountability to the public in contrast to the 
accountability of the judiciary. 
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political 
branch of the Government. Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing 
political interests, but not on the basis of the judges’ personal policy preferences. 
In contrast, an agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking 
                                                          
55 Id. at 844. Chevron emphasizes that a court should not reverse simply because it feels that another 
decision would have been preferable. William McGrath et al, supra note 9, at 761. 
56 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 (footnotes omitted). Later in the opinion the Court explained that it did not 
matter why Congress did not resolve the issue; perhaps it tried but without sufficient specificity, perhaps it 
consciously desired the agency to answer the question, perhaps it did not consider the issue at all, and 
perhaps it was not able to forge a coalition so both sides decided to take their chances with the agency. “For 
judicial purposes, it matters not which of these things occurred.” Id. at 865. 
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responsibilities may . . .  properly rely upon the incumbent administration’s views 
of wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly 
accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for 
this political branch of the Government to make such policy choices – resolving 
the competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, 
or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with administration of 
the statute in light of everyday realities.57 
The message from the Supreme Court was clear; federal judges “have a duty to 
respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do. The responsibilities for 
assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle between 
competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones,” but are vested in the 
political branches.58  
The Court did not, however, provide clear guidance for how a court should 
determine whether an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous provision in a statute is 
reasonable.59 Post-Chevron decisions show that step two deference is not total 
                                                          
57 Id. at 865-66. 
58 Id. at 866. “Chevron relies on constitutional structure, Congress’s legitimate authority to delegate 
lawmaking power to administrative agencies, and the political accountability of those agencies to the 
President and to Congress.” Mashaw, supra note 14, at 505. See also Asimow & Levin, supra note 6, at 
532-33. But see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)(“It is emphatically the province 
and duty of the judicial department  to say what the law is”). Moreover, winning or losing on step one does 
not necessarily dictate the ultimate result. There are some decisions where the appellate court determined 
that the governing statute was ambiguous but that the agency’s interpretation of the statute was not 
reasonable. See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’n, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 481 (2001) (concluding that 
EPA’s interpretation of Clean Air Act was unreasonable because it went beyond the limits of what was 
ambiguous); cf. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366, 390 & n. 11 (1999) (disagreement on 
the Court over the meaning of the work ‘impair’); Asimow & Levin, supra note  6, at 536 n.5.  Still, one 
study showed that an affirmance rate of 89 percent at step two. Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew B. Krueger, 
In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 1235, 1276 & n.214 (2007) (citing a 
study by Professor Orin S. Kerr). 
59 There is uncertainty about how step two should work. Asimow & Levin, supra note 6, at 536 n.5. 
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capitulation or unprincipled 60 but predictions are dicey other than saying that the 
agency’s chances of being affirmed are fairly good if the reviewing court proceeds to step 
two.61 In Chevron itself, the tools of statutory construction the Court used to determine 
that “stationary source” was ambiguous also seemed to be the tools the Court used in 
deciding that the “bubble concept” was reasonable.62 Perhaps the safest proposition to 
state is that the step two inquiry overlaps with the Administrative Procedure Act’s 
arbitrary and capricious test.63 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2001 decision in United States v. Mead64 imposed 
some uncertain limits on the applicability of Chevron.65 The contested issue was whether 
tariff classification rulings issued by the U.S. Customs Service were entitled to strong 
judicial deference under Chevron.66  The Customs Service issues 10,000 to 15,000 of 
these rulings every year from its 46 offices around the nation without going through 
either notice and comment rulemaking or a formal adjudication process.67 The Court 
concluded that the rulings were not entitled to Chevron deference because they did not 
have the force of law.68 The Court treated them “like ‘interpretations contained in policy 
                                                          
60 Fox, supra note 7, at 317. See also note 55 supra. 
61 Judge Wald on the D.C. Circuit concluded that the bulk of reversals came on Step One, Patricia Wald, A 
Response to Tiller and Cross, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 235, 243 (1999), and that the agency was reversed on Step 
Two only 11% of the time. Patricia Wald, Judicial Review in Mid-Passage: The Uneasy Partnership 
Between Courts and Agencies Plays On, 32 Tulsa L.J. 221, 242 (1996). 
62 See text and notes at notes 44 to 48 supra. 
63 See ,e.g, Shays v. FEC, 414 F.3d 76, 96-97 (D.C. Cir. 2005); National Association of Regulatory Utility 
Commissioners v. ICC, 41 F.3d 721 (D.C. Cir.  1994); General American Transportation Corp. v. ICC, 872 
F.2d 1048, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1989). John Rogers, Michael Healy & Ronald Krotoszynski, Administrative 
Law 572-73 (2d ed. 2008) 
64 533 U.S. 218 (2001). Mead has also generated a huge volume of scholarly commentary. See, e.g., 
Administrative Law Discussion Forum, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 565 (2002); Asimow & Levin, supra note 6, at 
561 n.3.  
65 Michael Healy, supa note 52, at 673. See also Mead, 533 U.S. at 239 (Scalia J., dissenting, saying that 
the courts will be sorting out the consequences of Mead for years to come). 
66 Mead, 533 U.S. at 221. 
67 Id. at   233. 
68 Id. at 221. 
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statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines’” which are “beyond the 
Chevron pale.”69 
The explanation for the Mead qualification on Chevron is as follows: 
[A]dministrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for 
Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the 
agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency 
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that 
authority. Delegation of such authority may be shown in a variety of ways, as by 
an agency’s power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking, 
or by some other indication of a comparable congressional intent.70 
Even though there was not sufficient evidence showing that Congress had 
intended tariff classification rulings to have the force of law, this was not the end of the 
matter.71 The Court remanded the case with instructions that the lower court afford 
Skidmore deference to the ruling.72 This gave new life to the Court’s 1944 decision in 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co.73 with its sliding scale approach to deference;74 an approach to 
deference based not on delegated authority and accountability as in Chevron, but on the 
                                                          
69 Id. at 234, quoting Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)(6-3 decision declaring that 
opinion letters and guidance documents issued by the Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division 
concerning the Fair Labor Standards Act did not warrant deference under Chevron).  
70 533 U.S. at 226-27. 
71 Id.at 231-34.  
72 Id. at 237-39. On remand, the Federal Circuit applied Skidmore deference and concluded that the 
Customs ruling should be set aside – it lacked the power to persuade. 283 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  
73 323 U.S. 134 (1944). FLSA cases can be brought in state or federal court. There is not an initial 
administrative proceeding. The dispute in Skidmore  was whether ‘on call’ firefighters in Swift’s 
employment were entitled to compensation for the time they spent at the plant waiting for a fire call. Id.at 
136. “Congress did not utilize the services of an administrative agency to find facts and to determine in the 
first instance whether particular cases fall within or without the Act. Instead, it put this responsibility on the 
courts.” Id. at 137.     
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capacity and expertise of agencies responsible for the day-to-day implementation of the 
their governing statutes.75 
 One of the issues in Skidmore was what weight, if any, should a court in a Fair 
Labor Standards Act case afford to interpretative bulletins issued by the Department of 
Labor’s Wage and Hour Division.76 These bulletins are practical guides to employers and 
employees.77 The Supreme Court said that these bulletins were not controlling upon the 
judiciary but that it was appropriate for the courts to resort to them for guidance.  
The weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the 
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its 
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which 
give it the power to persuade, if lacking power to control.78 
Justice Scalia wrote a forceful dissent in Mead that decried the resurrection of 
Skidmore and said that the majority opinion had made “an avulsive change in judicial 
review of federal administrative action.”79 He argued that the tariff rulings were entitled 
to Chevron deference but that the Court had replaced it “with that test most beloved by a 
court unwilling to be held to rules (and most feared by litigants who want to know what 
to expect): th’ ol’ ‘totality of the circumstances’ test.”80 He said that the Court’s criteria 
were flabby and looked like a grab bag of factors.81The consequences of the Mead 
                                                                                                                                                                             
74 Cooley Howarth, Jr., United States v. Mead Corp,: More Pieces for the Chevron/Skidmore Deference 
Puzzle, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 699,702 (2001); Hickman & Krueger, supra note 58, at 1251-59. Asimow & 
Levin, supra note 6, at 560 n.2. 
75 Mashaw, supra note 14, at 505. 
76 See 323 U.S. at 138-40 (discussing deference due the bulletin) 
77 Id. at 163.  
78 Id. at 140.  
79 533 U.S. at 239. 
80 Id. at 241. 
81 Id. at 245.  
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doctrine, according to Justice Scalia, would be uniformly bad82 He wanted Skidmore to 
be discarded as an anachronism.83  
Notwithstanding Justice Scalia’s attack, Skidmore is being applied regularly and 
its sliding scale runs from being almost as deferential as Chevron to virtually no 
deference at all.84 It is as if the federal courts have two deference doctrines; “the more 
rule-like Chevron and the more standard-like Skimore,” with the attendant problem of 
determining when one stops and the other begins.85 However, as explained in the 
following sections that discuss the decisions of Georgia’s appellate courts, there are not 
two deference doctrines in the Peach State’s administrative law jurisprudence; Skidmore 
has not had an impact on judicial review of a Georgia agency’s interpretation of its 
governing statute, and Georgia remains very much a strong deference state.86 
II. The Georgia Judiciary’s Approach to Deference    
A. The Early Decisions 
The Georgia Supreme Court’s willingness to afford considerable deference to the 
interpretation of a statute by the administrative agency charged with that statute’s 
enforcement and administration pre-dates not just Chevron, but also Skidmore.  The 
court’s 1935 ruling in Eason v. Morrison upheld a regulation adopted by the State Board 
of Barber Examiners that required previously licensed barbers seeking renewal to submit 
a laboratory report and a doctor’s certificate to show they were free from infections and 
contagious diseases.87 The Georgia Supreme Court did not discuss deference as such in 
                                                          
82 Id. at 261. 
83 Id. at 250. 
84 Hickman & Krueger, supra note 58, at 1295-99.  
85 Merrill, The Mead Doctrine supra note 38, at 808.  
86 In fact, it appears that Skidmore has been cited only once by a Georgia appellate court. See text and notes 
at notes 183 to 186 infra. 
87 182 S.E. 163, 164, 166 (Ga. 1935). 
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concluding the regulation was reasonable, but its analysis of the statutes regulating 
barbers and the licensing agency’s clear rule-making authority under the statute’s original 
and amended versions is consistent with Chevron.  
The legislation was not explicit on whether the Board of Barber Examiners could 
require a licensed barber to submit the laboratory report and health certificate with a 
renewal application so the court had to determine whether this agency action was in 
accord with the legislature’s grant of power to the Board to “adopt reasonable” 
regulations.88 Given the statute’s silence on the issue coupled with the explicit grant of 
rule-making power, the court went directly to what today we would call step two in order 
to determine whether the regulation was reasonable. The court first examined the title of 
the acts to aid its statutory construction,89 and noted that the preambles from both the 
original and revised versions of the statute said the Board was to regulate barbers, ensure 
proper sanitary conditions in barbershops and prevent the spread of disease.90 The court 
also emphasized the principle that laws protecting the public health should be liberally 
construed, and observed it was common knowledge that barbershops could be the source 
of infection and disease. It concluded that the regulation was not just reasonable, but 
salutary.91   
The court may not have followed two distinct steps, but it did use traditional tools 
of statutory construction to ultimately decide that the regulation was reasonable such as 
carefully reading the statutory preambles and noting the principle that statutes protecting 
health should be liberally construed. Today, federal courts on Chevron step two often 
                                                          
88 Id. at 166. 
89 Id. at 165. 
90 Id. 
91 Id.at 165-166. 
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examine the same statutory materials they relied upon in step one, and engage in 
conventional statutory construction to determine the reasonableness of the agency’s 
interpretation of an ambiguous provision.92  
In State v. Camp, a 1939 decision concerning the interpretation and application of 
Georgia’s inheritance tax by the State Revenue Commissioner, the Georgia Supreme 
Court made several statements about deference and statutory construction.93 The 
executors of an estate valued at just over $50,000, who had paid federal estate taxes but 
did not file a state return, were issued an execution for a small amount by the State 
Revenue Commissioner.94 They challenged this tax because the Georgia law, passed in 
1926, referred to the federal act of 1926 with its $100,000 exemption, not the federal acts 
of 1932 and 1934 that reduced the exemption to $50,000.95 It was not clear whether the 
changes to federal law altered the Georgia statute. The trial court ruled in favor of the 
estate and the supreme court affirmed.96 After discussing the several changes in the 
pertinent federal and state tax statutes in the 1920s and early 1930s, the court said that 
construing the Code as urged by the State would have “the unreasonable effect of taking 
92 per cent of all inherited property under the higher-bracket schedule.”97 It noted the 
principle that ambiguous tax statutes should be construed in favor of citizens and 
emphasized that the trial court’s interpretation was “in accord with the interpretation 
which has been given by the State administrative authorities for a number of years, 
during which time there have been several sessions of the General Assembly without any 
                                                          
92 A Blackletter Statement, supra note 32, at 38; Keith Werlan, Principles of Administrative Law 340 
(2008). 
93 6 S.E.2d 299, 299 (Ga. 1939). 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 301 & 303. 
96 Id at 304. 
97 Id.  
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disturbance of such administrative interpretation.”98 Accordingly, it determined that the 
trial court had properly construed Georgia’s tax code as referring to the 1926 federal 
statute with its higher exemption. 
This conclusion was consistent with the court’s statement in its Syllabus “that the 
contemporaneous practical construction of ambiguous or doubtful provisions of an act by 
the department of the State empowered with its administration or supervision will be 
given great weight, and will not be disturbed except for weighty reasons.”99 This 
statement is very similar to step two in Chevron, to the effect that reasonable 
interpretations are to be upheld even if the agency’s interpretation is not the one the court 
would have made, and it emphasizes the Georgia Supreme Court’s willingness to defer to 
a state agency’s interpretation of ambiguous provisions in the legislation that the agency 
is charged to administer and enforce. 
Over thirty years after Camp, the Georgia Court of Appeals, in Belton v. 
Columbus Finance, cited several federal district court decisions for the proposition that 
“[i]nterpretations of law made by those who are administering it, while not conclusive, 
are to be given great weight.”100 It also cited one of its own decisions for a similar 
proposition: administrative rulings are not binding on the court of appeals but “they will 
be adopted when they conform to the meaning [of the governing statute] which this court 
                                                          
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 300 (emphasis added); see also Sawnee Elec. Membership Corp. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 
544 S.E.2d 158, 162 (Ga. 2001)(Hunstein J., dissenting), citing and quoting  State of Georgia v. Camp, 6 
S.E.2d 299 (Ga. 1939). 
100 Belton v. Columbus Finance & Thrift Co., 195 S.E.2d 195, 197 (Ga. App. 1972). See also National 
Advertising Co. v. Department of Transportation, 254 S.E.2d 571, 573 (Ga. App. 1979) (repeating this 
proposition, citing Belton, noting that DOT’s interpretation reconciled statutory provisions without 
straining words, that legislative intent was not perverted, and that even though DOT had never issued a 
ruling on the Code section in question, DOT’s rejection of application would stand). 
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deems should properly be given.”101 This case focused on whether a particular procedure 
followed under a state statute violated Regulation Z in the federal Truth in Lending 
Act.102 The court found no violation of the federal statute, in part because the form used 
under the state statute was similar to that recommended by federal authorities.103 
In a 1975 decision, Georgia Real Estate Commission v. Accelerated Courses in 
Real Estate, the Georgia Supreme Court cited its 1935 ruling in Eason v. Morrison for 
the proposition “that the test of validity of an administrative rule is twofold: (1) Is it 
authorized by statute, and (2) is it reasonable?”104 Among other things, the statute said:  
“Each applicant for a salesman’s license shall (1) furnish evidence of completion of 
twenty-four in class hours in a course of study approved by the commission.”105 Shortly 
after this statute became effective the Commission adopted rules for its implementation, 
one of which stated that “[n]o course offering of between 24 and 48 hours in duration will 
be approved unless the schedule calls for three or less hours per day of classroom 
study.”106 Accelerated applied to become an acceptable provider of real estate courses but 
was rejected because it did not comply with this rule; it wanted to offer a twenty- four 
hour course consisting of three days of instruction of eight hours each day – well in 
excess of the rule’s three hour daily maximum.107   
                                                          
101 Belton, 195 S.E.2d at 197. 
102 Id.at 196.  
103 Id. at 196-97. See also Brown v. Quality Finance Co., 145 S.E.2d 99, 100 (Ga. App. 1965) (stating that 
“[w]here the method of calculating the insurance refund is not specified by statute, it would properly be a 
subject for clarification under the rule-making power of the Industrial Loan Commissioner  …  which rules, 
if consistent with the provisions of the Act, would then have the force and effect of law.”); Mason v. Serv. 
Loan & Fin. Co., 198 S.E.2d 391, 394 (Ga. App. 1973)(giving great weight to rule promulgated by 
Industrial Loan Commissioner under Industrial Loan Act). 
104 214 S.E.2d 495, 498 (1975) 
105 Id. at 495-96 quoting OCGA § 84-1411(b) (emphasis removed from original). 
106 Id. at 497 (emphasis removed from original).    
107 Id.  
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Accelerated challenged the rule but the supreme court held that it was valid; it 
examined the language of the statute, noted that it explicitly empowered the agency to 
adopt rules not inconsistent with its provisions, explained that this rule was not contrary 
to the law, and said that it was reasonable.108 The Court explained that the test of 
reasonableness in this context focused not on the impact of the rule upon a particular 
educational format or school, but on the impact of the rule on students and the public.109 
The Commission submitted evidence “showing that the ‘distributed learning’ method has 
recognized educational value” and asserted that this demonstrated that the rule was not 
arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.110 The court also acknowledged that Accelerated 
had evidence showing the benefits of its compressed format but said that 
the courts of this state are not in the position of promulgating educational policy. 
Even though the real estate commission may not be expert in educational matters, 
the responsibility in this area is the commission’s and not the courts’, and there 
was evidence to justify the commission’s decision.111 
This rationale for deference to the Real Estate Commission’s judgment is very 
similar to one of explanations that the U.S. Supreme Court offered 9 years later in 
Chevron.112 Moreover, in deciding the second step – determining that the regulation was 
reasonable – the Georgia Supreme Court, like federal courts today applying Chevron step 
two, went with the arbitrary and capricious test.113 
                                                          
108 Id. at 499. 
109 Id. at 499-500. 
110 Id. at 500. 
111 Id.  
112 See text and notes at notes 55 to 58 supra. 
113 214 S.E.2d at 500. See also Michael Asimow & Ronald Levin, supra note 6, at 537 note 5; Werhan, 
suupa note 92, at 342. See also text and notes at notes 59 to 63 supra. 
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 In a 1978 decision, Bentley v. Chastain, the Georgia Supreme Court stated 
additional reasons for deferring to agencies when striking down a statute and ordinance 
providing for de novo jury review of a zoning board of appeals’ decisions.114 The court 
emphasized that agency “decisions are not to be taken lightly or minimized by the 
judiciary. Review overbroad in scope would have the effect of substituting the judgment 
of a judge or jury for that of the agency, thereby nullifying the benefits of legislative 
delegation to a specialized body.”115 This statement sounds much like another one of the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s explanations for deference offered six years later in Chevron.116 
The Georgia Supreme Court also stated: 
[A]gencies provide a high level of expertise and an opportunity for specialization 
unavailable in the judicial or legislative branches. They are able to use these 
skills, along with the policy mandate and discretion entrusted to them by the 
legislature to make rules and enforce them in fashioning solutions to very 
complex problems.117 
This is yet another rationale for deference that is similar to what the U.S. Supreme 
Court said in Chevron.118  
The legislative delegation and expertise rationales for deference were repeated by 
the Georgia Court of Appeals in 2004, 2008, 2010 and again in 2011 in explaining why it 
                                                          
114 249  S.E.2d 38, 41 (1978)(the statute and ordinance unconstitutionally burdened the courts with 
nonjudicial functions). See also Shipley, supra note 1, at 1159-60. 
115 Id. at 40. See also Dept. of Cmty. Health v. Gwinnett Hosp. Sys., 586 S.E.2d 762, 765 (Ga. App. 
2004)(quoting and citing  this language from Bentley v. Chastain). 
116 See text and notes at notes 55 to 58 supra.  
117 249 S.E.2d  at 40. See also Albany Surgical PC v. Department of Community Health, 572 S.E.2d 638, 
641 (Ga. App. 2003)(quoting this language from Bentley v. Chastain); Department of Community Health v. 
Gwinnett Hospital System, 586 S.E.2d 762, 765 (2004)(quoting this language from Bentley v. Chastain); 
Palmyra  Park Hospital, Inc. v. Phoebe Sumter Medical Center, 714 S.E.2d 71, 75 (Ga. App. 2011)(quoting 
this language from Bentley v. Chastain). 
118 See text and notes at notes 55 to 58 supra.  
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should defer to the Department of Community Health (DCH) interpretations of its 
governing statute and administrative rules. The 2004 case involved Gwinnett Hospital 
and the grant of a Certificate of Need (CON), the 2008 decision concerned Medicaid 
benefits, the 2010 litigation was about a Winder facility objecting to the agency’s grant of 
a CON to a Hall County enterprise, and the 2011 decision involved an unsuccessful 
challenge by hospitals in Albany and Sumter County to the grant of a CON for a new 
hospital in Dougherty County.119 
 In affirming the grant of a CON by DCH’s Division of Health Planning in the 
Gwinnett Hospital case, the court of appeals said that the agency was responsible for 
interpreting and applying the statute, the state health plan, and its rules and regulations in 
order to carry out its duties as established by the General Assembly.120 The court then 
offered the following ‘expertise’ explanation for the creation of the DCH and for 
deference: 
The legislature cedes this authority to the Division because the public is better 
served by having experts in the complexities of health care planning make these 
decisions. The issues are complicated, and the applicable laws, rules, regulations, 
and precedents require much study, especially for a decision-maker who is not 
already familiar with them.121  
B. Georgia Decisions After 1984 and U.S. Supreme Court’s Chevron Decision 
 The U.S. Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in Chevron may have brought about a 
significant change in how federal courts, lawyers who practice before federal agencies, 
                                                          
119  Department of Community Health v. Gwinnett Hospital System, 586 S.E.2d 762, 765 (2004); Georgia 
Department of Community Health v. Medders, 664 S.E.2d 832, 833-34 (Ga. App. 2008); Northeast Georgia 
Medical Center v. Winder HMA, Inc., 693 S.E.2d 110 (Ga. App. 2010); Palmyra Park Hospital v. Sumter 
Medical Center, 714 S.E.2d 71 (Ga. App. 2011).  
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and administrative law scholars analyze the merits of an administrative agency’s rule or 
order,122 but the jurisprudence of Georgia’s Supreme Court and Court of Appeals on 
deference has been unaffected by Chevron even as it took on canonical status.123 
Georgia’s appellate courts continue to repeat the “well-settled principle of law that even 
though an interpretation of a statute by an agency charged with the duty of enforcing is 
not conclusive, it is entitled to great weight.”124 
 For instance, in Kelly v. Lloyd’s of London the Georgia Supreme Court decided 
three certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit.125 One question was whether a policy of aircraft and aerial application insurance 
issued by Lloyd’s of London to a crop dusting business was exempt from the filing 
requirement in OCGA § 33-24-9(a).126 The court quoted the code section, highlighted the 
exclusion from filing for policies and “forms of unique character designed for … 
insurance upon a particular subject,” noted that only nine companies provided coverage 
                                                                                                                                                                             
120 586 S.E.2d at 765. 
121 Id. See also, Palmyra Park Hospital, 714 S.E.2d at 75. 
122 “Many, probably most, lower courts regularly treat [Chevron] as the starting point for their analysis of 
the merits of an administrative rule or order. By any measure it is a landmark decision with which every 
administrative lawyer must be familiar.” Asimow & Levin, supra note 6, at 531 n.1. 
123 Cf. Merrill, The Story of Chevron, supra note 7, at 402; Asimow & Levin, supra note  6 , at 531 note 1.  
124 Kelly v. Lloyd’s of London, 336 S.E.2d 772, 774 (Ga. 1985) (giving deference to the Insurance 
Commission). See also Albany Surgical, PC v. Department of Community Health, 572 S.E.2d 638, 641 
(Ga. App. 2003)(noting deference to policy decisions by executive agencies while holding regulations 
reasonable); Department of Community Health v. Gwinnett Hospital System, 586 S.E.2d 762, 765 (Ga. 
App. 2004)(giving deference to DCH’s Division of Health Planning); Piedmont Healthcare, Inc. v. Georgia 
Department of Human Resources, 638 S.E.2d 447, 451 (Ct. App. 2006)(giving deference to the Office of 
Regulatory Services within the Department of Human Resources); Georgia Department of Community 
Health v. Medders, 664 S.E.2d 832, 833-34 (Ga. App. 2008) (giving deference to the agency); City of 
LaGrange v. Ga. Power Co., 363 S.E.2d 286 (Ga. App. 1987) (giving deference to the Public Service 
Commission); North Georgia EMC v. City of Calhoun, 393 S.E.2d  510 (Ga. App. 1990) (giving deference 
to the Public Service Commission)  ; Colquitt EMC v. City of Moultrie, 399 S.E.2d 497 (Ga. App. 1990); 
Sawanee Electrical Membership Corp. v. Georgia Public Service Commission, 544 S.E.2d 158 (2001); 
Georgia Power v. Georgia Public Service Commission, 675 S.E.2d 294 (Ga. App. 2009). 
125 336 S.E.2d  772, 774-76 (Ga. 1985). 
126 Id. at 774. Lloyd’s sought declaratory relief that the policy it issued did not apply because the 
employee’s death occurred in the course of his employment and thus it fell under the policy’s workers’ 
 25
for the roughly 120 aerial pesticide contractors in Georgia, and said that these statistics 
“militate[d] toward the conclusion” that this coverage was unique and thus within the 
statute’s exclusionary language.127 The court said that its conclusion was buttressed by 
the interpretation of the statute by the Insurance Commissioner.128 It quoted the familiar 
language about the great weight courts give to agency interpretations and stated: 
Mr. Ralph W. Terry, Chief Deputy Insurance Commissioner … expressly stated 
in an affidavit, that Lloyd’s is not required to file this particular policy with the 
Insurance Commissioner pursuant to OCGA § 33-24-9(a). He added that none of 
the other insurance companies issuing policies for aerial pesticide contractors had 
forms on file with the insurance commissioner’s office.129 
 Did the supreme court give great weight to the agency’s interpretation of the 
exclusionary language in the Code or did it resolve the issue on its own? It is fair to say 
that the court gave great weight to the agency. The statute itself did not define a policy or 
form of “unique character designed for . . . insurance upon a particular subject” other than 
saying such policies were excluded from the filing requirement. Accordingly, the statute 
was ambiguous so the court turned to the agency. It was clear that the Insurance 
Commission treated this kind of coverage as unique because it had never required filing 
by Lloyd’s of London and the eight other insurers for Georgia’s 120 aerial pesticide 
contractors. This was a reasonable interpretation and application of the statute by the 
Insurance Commissioner. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
compensation exclusion. Id. Lloyd’s had not filed the policy so it had to deal with the argument that this 
voided the coverage exclusion and made it unenforceable. Id.at 774-75. 
127 Id at 774 (emphasis removed). 
128 Id.  
129Id.  
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There are many appellate cases discussing deference and the Public Service 
Commission (PSC).130 For instance, in City of LaGrange v. Georgia Power Co. the court 
of appeals affirmed the PSC’s interpretation and application of the Georgia Territorial 
Service Act in ruling that the LaGrange did not have the exclusive right to provide power 
to a facility in a new industrial park.131 The court summarized the statute, reviewed the 
facts, explained its rejection of the City’s interpretation of the statute, said the PSC’s 
interpretation harmonizing the statute’s sections was reasonable and sensible, and then 
stated: 
In interpreting OCGA § 46-3-8, it is our duty to consider the subsections 
in pari materia, and to reconcile them, if possible, so that they may be read as 
consistent and harmonious with one another. The construction given the statute by 
the PSC is consistent with these established principles of statutory construction. 
Moreover, the PSC, as the agency charged with oversight and supervision of 
electric power companies in this State, OCGA § 46-2-20(a), including the 
enforcement and administration of the Georgia Territorial Electric Service Act, is 
entitled to great deference in its interpretation of the Act. ‘The administrative 
interpretation of a statute by an administrative agency which has the duty of 
enforcing or administering is to be given great weight.132 
                                                          
130 See, e.g., City of LaGrange v. Ga. Power Co., 363 S.E.2d 286 (Ga. App. 1987);  North Georgia EMC v. 
City of Calhoun, 393 S.E.2d  510 (Ga. App. 1990); Colquitt EMC v. City of Moultrie, 399 S.E.2d 497 (Ga. 
App. 1990); Sawanee Electrical Membership Corp. v. Georgia Public Service Commission, 544 S.E.2d 158 
(2001); Georgia Power v. Georgia Public Service Commission, 675 S.E.2d 294 (Ga. App. 2009). There 
also are several cases the discuss deference to the Department of Community Health. See,e.g.,Department 
of Community Health v. Gwinnett Hospital System, 586 S.E.2d 762, 765 (2004); Georgia Department of 
Community Health v. Medders, 664 S.E.2d 832, 833-34 (Ga. App. 2008). 
131 363 S.E.2d 286, 289 (Ga. App. 1987). 
132 Id. at 288 (citations omitted).  
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 Three judges dissented.133 They asserted that the majority and the PSC had 
misconstrued plain and unambiguous language in the statute, failed to follow the supreme 
court’s construction of the statute, and were thwarting the purpose and intent of the 
Georgia legislature.134 Notwithstanding this vigorous dissent, the language from the City 
of LaGrange decision about deference is frequently cited and quoted in other decisions 
which uphold rulings made by the PSC.135   
Sawnee Electrical Membership Corp. v. Georgia Public Service Commission136 is 
an oft-cited 2001 decision by the Georgia Supreme Court that is especially instructive in 
part because of another spirited dissent. Like City of LaGrange, this case involved a 
disagreement over the interpretation and application of the Georgia Territorial Electrical 
Service Act.137 In a nutshell, Sawnee Electrical Membership Cooperative (EMC) filed a 
complaint with the PSC that Georgia Power was unlawfully supplying power to a large 
apartment complex in Sawnee’s territory. An administrative law judge ruled for Sawnee 
but the full PSC went with Georgia Power, holding that the statute’s large customer 
choice exception was applicable. The superior court reversed and then the court of 
appeals reversed, agreeing with the PSC that the exception applied.138  The supreme court 
granted certiorari and, notwithstanding the acknowledged deference to the PSC, it 
ultimately reversed the agency in a 4-3 decision.139  
                                                          
133 Id. at 289. 
134 Id. at 289-90. 
135 See, e.g., North Georgia EMC v. City of Calhoun, 393 S.E.2d 510 (Ga. App. 1990); Colquitt EMC v. 
City of Moultrie, 399 S.E.2d 497 (Ga. App. 1991). 
136 544 S.E.2d 158 (Ga. 2001)  
137 Id. at 159. 
138 Id. at 160. 
139 Id. at 160 and 162. 
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The fundamental disagreement within the supreme court was whether the 
language of the large-load exception in the statute was ambiguous.140 Justice Hunstein’s 
dissent said that the agency’s interpretation of ambiguous language in the statute, in 
particular the term ‘one consumer,’ was entitled to deference and that the majority 
offered no “weighty reasons” for substituting its judgment for the reasoned expertise of 
the agency.141 In contrast, Justice Thompson’s majority opinion started with the cardinal 
rule of statutory construction; a court is to ascertain legislative intent and to give the 
statute the construction that will effectuate that intent.142 He then turned to the statute’s 
declaration of intent and the statute’s definition of ‘premises’ and, after noting that the 
word ‘consumer’ was not defined, he turned Webster’s Third New World Dictionary and 
Black’s Law Dictionary to give that word meaning.143 In contrast to Justice Hunstein, he 
determined that the statute’s language was unambiguous and that deference was not 
appropriate because “[a]dministrative rulings are not binding on this Court, and will only 
be adopted when they conform to the meaning which the appellate court deems should 
properly be given.”144 The majority also said “administrative rulings are adopted only 
after the court has made an independent determination that they correctly reflect the 
meaning of the statute.”145 
The several statements from Sawnee about deference emphasize that a Georgia 
appellate court first has to make an independent determination about the meaning of the 
                                                          
140 Id. at 163 (Hunstein J., dissenting). 
141 Id.at 162. 
142 Id. at 160 (majority opinion) 
143  Id. at 160-61 (majority opinion). 
144 Id. at 161. The apartment complex in question, with 380 units, each with separate meters, did not 
constitute ‘one consumer’ with ‘single metered service’ as contemplated by the statute in view of the law’s 
declaration of intent and the meaning of the plain language of the statutory exception. Id. 
145 Id. at 162 citing and quoting from National Advertising Co. v. Department of Transportation, 254 S.E.2d 
571, 574 (1979). 
 29
statute by looking at its plain language and determining legislative intent. If the agency 
interpretation is at odds with unambiguous statutory language and the intent of the 
General Assembly, then it will not be adopted.146 Another way this has been expressed by 
the Georgia Court of Appeals is that “erroneous applications of law to undisputed facts as 
well as decisions based on erroneous theories of law are subject to the de novo standard 
of review.”147 This is similar to Chevron step one; when the intent of the legislature is 
clear, “that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect 
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”148 Moreover, it is clear that the 
Georgia judiciary, like the federal judiciary, is the final authority on issues of statutory 
construction and must reject agency interpretations and constructions that are contrary to 
clear legislative intent.149 
Moreover, the strong disagreements within the Georgia Supreme Court and the 
Georgia Court of Appeals in Sawnee and in City of LaGrange on whether the statutes 
were ambiguous is hardly unique. Those courts’ justices and judges have the same 
traditional tools of statutory construction available to them, but they do not always select 
the same tools. As a result, what is clear and unambiguous for some might be vague and 
ambiguous for others.150 The same thing holds true for the U.S. Supreme Court. The 
justices are sometimes in sharp disagreement over the meaning of a statute and the clarity 
of congressional intent even though they have the same tools of statutory construction at 
                                                          
146 Sawnee, 544 S.E.2d at 161-62. 
147 McLendon v. Advertising That Works, 665 S.E.2d 370, 371 (Ga. App. 2008) citing and quoting from 
Trent Tube v. Hurston, 583 S.E.2d 198 (Ga. App. 2003). 
148 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
149 Id. at 482 n.9. Compare this paraphrase from Chevron to the language in Sawnee.  
150 See, e.g., Georgia Department of Revenue v. Owens Corning, 660 S.E.2d 719 (2008)(4-3 decision);   
Center for a Sustainable Coast v. Coastal Marshlands Protection Committee, 670 S.E.2d 429 (Ga. 2008)(5-
2) 
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their disposal.151 The late Karl Llewelyn was correct when he wrote in 1950 that “there 
are two opposing canons on almost every point.”152 
C. The 2008 Decisions 
The Georgia Supreme Court’s first discussion of deference in 2008 was in 
Georgia Department of Revenue v. Owens Corning.153 The taxpayer, Owens Corning, 
claimed a sales tax exemption for machinery repair parts so it sought a refund. The 
Department of Revenue failed to rule on the request so Owens Corning sued for the 
refund. The superior court granted summary judgment for the agency but the court of 
appeals reversed, holding that the 1997 version of the state tax code154 clearly and 
unambiguously created an exemption from sales tax for machinery repair parts.155 The 
supreme court granted certiorari to determine whether or not the statute was clear and 
ultimately reversed the court of appeals and agreed with the agency.156 The supreme court 
stated: “Based on the applicable standards of review, the legislative history of the statute, 
and the Legislature’s expressed intent that machinery repair parts not be extended a sales 
                                                          
151 See, e.g., INS v. Caroza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987)(6-3 decision with the majority holding no 
deference to the INS); MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1984)(6-3 decision 
with the majority holding no deference to the FCC because its interpretation went beyond the meaning that 
the statute could bear). Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392 (1996)(disagreement over whether 
certain categories of workers in the poultry business came within the “on the farm” exclusion from the 
NLRA’s coverage); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000)( disagreement over 
whether the Food & Drug Administration had jurisdiction to regulate tobacco ); Christensen v. Harris 
County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000)(disagreement over whether Department of Labor opinion letters and guidance 
documents pertaining to the Fair Labor Standards Act are entitled to Chevron deference); Carcieri v. 
Salazar,     U.S.    (2009)(6-3 decision holding that the Secretary of the Interior could not take land into 
trust for a tribe not recognized in 1934 when the Indian Reorganization Act was passed – term ‘now’ in the 
statute is not ambiguous).. 
152 Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How 
Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395, 401 (1950). 
153 660 S.E.2d 719 (Ga. 2008). See also  Martin Wilson & Jennifer Blackburn, Administrative Law, 60 
Mercer L. Rev. 1, 15-16 (2008)(discussing generally the Owens Corning case). 
154 OCGA § 48-8-3 (34) (A). 
155 Owens Corning, 660 S.E.2d at 720. 
156 Id. at 720, 722. 
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tax exemption prior to 2000, we find that no clear, unambiguous exemption for 
machinery repair parts existed in 1997.”157 
 Consistent with Chevron, the Georgia Supreme Court used several canons of 
statutory interpretation in concluding that the statute was ambiguous. For example: 
“[t]axation is the rule, and exemption from taxation [is] the exception,” and “every 
exemption, to be valid, must be expressed in clear and unambiguous terms.”158 It also 
explained how Georgia’s sales and use tax statutes had evolved since 1951; the first 
statute did not exempt machinery repair parts, 1994 amendments made no reference to 
machinery repair parts, and the 1997 amendments did not create an explicit exemption 
but instead created ambiguity by using the phrase ‘replacement components.’159  The 
court said “if the Legislature wished to reverse this historical trend in the 1997 
amendment, it would have done so explicitly.”160 Moreover, amendments passed in 2000 
clarified the statute and “eradicate[d] any ambiguity caused by the 1997 statute.”161  
Because the 1997 version of the statute was ambiguous, it was appropriate for the court to 
repeat the well-established principle that “the interpretation of a statute by an 
administrative agency which has the duty of enforcing or administering it is to be given 
great weight and deference.”162  
Three justices dissented.163 They asserted, among things, that the majority had not 
adhered to the ‘golden rule’ of statutory construction; “to follow the literal language of 
                                                          
157 Id.at 720 
158 Id. The supreme court said that the standards for review tax statutes are settled. Id. citing Collins v. City 
of Dalton, 408 S.E.2d 106, 108 (Ga. 1991). 
159 660 S.E.2d at 720-21. 
160 Id. at 721. The court also repeated the canon that in cases of ambiguity, tax statutes are interpreted in 
favor of the tax, not the exemption. Id. 
161 Id. See also Wilson & Blackburn, supra note 153, at 16.  
162 Id.citing Kelly v. Lloyd’s of London, 336 S.E.2d 772 (Ga. 1985). 
163 Id.at 722. (Carley, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Hines and Thompson). 
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the statute ‘unless it produces contradiction, absurdity or such an inconvenience as to 
insure that the legislature meant something else.’”164 They believed that the statute was 
clear in providing a sales tax exemption for Owens Corning’s machinery repair parts and 
that the majority had dispensed with the usual rules of statutory construction to 
erroneously find ambiguity in an otherwise clear statute.165 In any event, this decision, 
like City of LaGrange and Sawnee, drives home the point that winning often turns on the 
strength of the arguments on the clarity of the statute at issue. Here the agency won; 
deference was appropriate because the majority regarded the statute as ambiguous and the 
agency’s position was reasonable.  
The Georgia Supreme Court’s next discussion of deference in 2008 was in Pruitt 
Corporation v. Georgia Department of Community Health.166 The dispute was over how 
to calculate the reimbursement formula under the state Medicaid program applicable to a 
nursing facility that had changed ownership with less than six months remaining in the 
fiscal year. In particular, there was disagreement over the meaning of the phrase ‘last 
approved cost report’ found in the policy and procedures manual used by the Department 
of Community Health (DCH). The manual did not define this phrase,167 and the manual 
was not promulgated by DCH pursuant to the rule-making procedures specified in the 
Georgia Administrative Procedures Act.168   
                                                          
164 Id. at 722-23. 
165 Id. at 725. 
166 664 S.E.2d 223 (Ga. 2008). See also Martin Wilson & Jennifer Blackburn,  Administative Law, 61 
Mercer L. Rev. 1, 23-34 (2009). 
167 664 S.E.2d at 223. 
168 Id. at 225. Under the federal Administrative Procedure Act this manual might be considered a 
interpretative rule or a general statement of policy. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A). 
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DCH reimburses participating facilities according a per diem rate specific to each 
facility.169 In order to participate in the program, nursing facilities must enter into an 
agreement with DCH, and that agreement incorporates the policy and procedures manual 
by reference. It contains a reimbursement formula based on the facility’s annual cost 
report and in respect to a new owner, like Pruitt Corporation, the agency interpreted ‘last 
approved cost report’ as being the prior owner’s cost report for the preceding fiscal year. 
An ALJ reversed, saying that the phrase was ambiguous and that Pruitt should benefit 
from a more favorable interpretation.170  The commissioner reversed the ALJ, concluding 
that ‘approved’ should be equated with ‘audited’ and noting that the last audited cost 
report was for the prior owner. Pruitt sought review and a superior court reversed the 
commissioner and agreed with the ALJ.171  
The agency then took the matter to the court of appeals. That court found 
evidence to support the agency’s decision, and said that the superior court failed to give 
“proper deference to DCH’s interpretation of its own rules.”172 The agency’s 
interpretation of the manual was not unreasonable so the court of appeals reversed and 
thus affirmed the commissioner.173 
The supreme court vacated and remanded this ruling, stating that it disagreed with 
the intermediate court’s “holding that judicial deference had to be afforded DCH’s 
interpretation of the phrase ‘last approved cost report.’”174 The court repeated the familiar 
language about deferring to an agency’s interpretation of the statutes it is charged with 
                                                          
169 664 S.E.2d .at 224. 
170 See Martin Wilson & Jennifer Blackburn, Administrative Law, 59 Mercer L. Rev. 1, 12 
(2007)(discussing the court of appeals decision in Pruitt). 
171 645 S.E.2d at 14-15 (court of appeals opinion); Wilson & Blackburn, supra note 170, at 12.  
172 664 S.E.2d at 225. See Wilson & Blackburn, supra note 170, at 11-12. 
173 645 S.E.2d at 16-17. 
174 664 S.E.2d at 225. 
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administering.175 It also said that it was appropriate to defer to an “agency’s interpretation 
of rules and regulations it has enacted to fulfill the function given it by the legislative 
branch.”176 Notwithstanding these settled principles, the supreme court next explained 
why DCH’s interpretation of the manual was not entitled to deference: 
The Court of Appeals gave the deference due a statute, rule or regulation to a term 
in a departmental manual, the terms of which had not undergone the scrutiny 
afforded a statute during the legislative process or the adoption process through 
which all rules and regulations must pass. See OCGA § 50-13-4. Inasmuch as the 
manual was not entitled to judicial deference since it was not a duly-enacted 
statute, rule or regulation, the Court of Appeals erred in affording judicial 
deference to DCH’s interpretation of the manual’s phrase in question.177  
The Georgia Supreme Court’s refusal in Pruitt to defer to DCH regarding its 
interpretation of the manual is in line with the U.S. Supreme Court’s refusal in United 
States v. Mead Corporation178 to afford Chevron deference to tariff classification rulings 
issued by the U.S. Customs Service. The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that Congress 
did not intend those rulings to carry the force of law in part because 10,000 to 15,000 are 
issued every year by the nation’s forty-six Customs Offices without following a formal, 
                                                          
175 Id. 
176 Id. citing and quoting from The Atlanta Journal & Constitution v. Babush, 364 S.E.2d 560, 562 (Ga. 
1988) (this was an open meetings case involving the State Personnel Board and that agency’s interpretation 
of the words ‘hearing’ and ‘review’ in its Rules – the Court said that in construing administrative rules, ‘the 
ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is 
plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the [rule]’ citing and quoting from U.S. v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 
872 (1977)). In the absence of an unambiguous statute or regulations, the U.S. Supreme Court also defers to 
an agency’s interpretation of its regulations. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461, 462 (1997); Talk 
America, Inc. v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 564 U.S. __, __ (2011). 
177 Pruitt, 664 S.E.2d at 225. The Georgia Supreme Court held in 1991 a department publication with 
policies and procedures for nursing home services was not a ‘rule’ as defined in the Georgia APA. Georgia 
Department of Medical Assistance v. Beverly Enterprises, 401 S.E.2d 499 (Ga. 1991). 
178 533 U.S. 218 (2001) 
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deliberative process.179  Similarly, the manual at issue in Pruitt was not adopted through 
the rule-making procedures in Georgia’s APA.180 
At this point in its opinion, however, the Georgia Supreme Court did not follow 
Mead and say that a lower degree of deference, as expressed in Skidmore,181 might be 
appropriate. Instead, it stated that since the DCH manual is incorporated by reference into 
the nursing facility’s agreement with the agency, the phrase should be treated as a 
contractual provision and “its meaning is determined by application of the rules of 
contract construction.”182 The court said it did not have to decide whether the agency’s 
decisions on policy, as reflected in the manual, were entitled to deference.183 
After Pruitt it is reasonable to ask whether there is a second standard of deference 
in Georgia that is similar to Skidmore’s multi-factored, sliding scale. I do not think so but 
it is worth noting that the Georgia Court of Appeals cited Skidmore in a 1953 decision, 
Yearty v. General Wholesale Co.184 which concerned an employee’s federal claim for 
overtime compensation arising under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).185 The 
claimant cited an interpretive bulletin of the U.S. Department of Labor in support of his 
argument that he was covered by the FLSA.186 Skidmore was an FLSA case so it is not 
surprising that the Court of Appeals cited it for the following statement: “While 
applicable interpretations by the Wage and Hour Administrator must be given 
                                                          
179 Id. at  233-34. The tariff classification rulings were not issued pursuant to a relatively formal and 
deliberate process like rule-making or formal adjudication. 
180 664 S.E.2d at 225. 
181 533 U.S.  238-39 citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139  (1944). 
182 664 S.E.2d. at 226. The court also disagreed with the court of appeals’ agreement with the agency’s 
assertion that its final decision was entitled to affirmance if there was any evidence to support it. Id. The 
court stated it is not enough that findings of fact are supported by evidence. A court is authorized to reverse 
or modify a determination that the agency’s application of the law to the facts is clearly erroneous. Id. 
183 Id. at 225.  
184 76 S.E.2d 715, 717 (Ga. App. 1953). 
185 Id. at 716. 
186 Id. at 717. 
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considerable weight in arriving at a proper definition of the scope of a provision of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act … it is for the courts, in the final analysis, to determine the 
coverage of the act.” 187 Notwithstanding the bulletin the court held that the employee did 
not come within the FLSA.188 This old case arose under federal law, so the fact the court 
of appeals cited Skidmore should not be interpreted to mean that Georgia’s appellate 
courts would use Skidmore’s sliding scale approach to deference in reviewing decisions 
of state agencies. To the contrary, the Georgia Supreme Court had the opportunity to go 
with a Skidmore-like sliding scale in Pruitt but said that it did not have to decide whether 
the agency’s decisions on policy, as reflected in a manual that was not adopted as a 
regulation under the Georgia APA, were entitled to deference.189 
The Georgia Supreme Court’s third discussion of deference in 2008 was in its 
unanimous affirmation of a superior court ruling that Secretary of State Karen Handel 
had committed error of law in her application of OCGA § 21-2-217. She had determined 
that James Powell was not qualified to run for the Public Service Commission because he 
did not reside in the district he sought to represent.190 The pertinent statutes are; OCGA § 
42-2-1(b) which requires candidates to have resided in the district they seek to represent 
for twelve months prior to election to that office, and OCGA § 21-2-217(a) which sets 
out fifteen rules to be followed in determining the residency of a person seeking to 
qualify to run for elective office. This code section does not spell out how the several 
                                                          
187 Id.at 716. 
188 Id.at 721  See also Perwitz v. Irvindale Farms, Inc., 53 S.E.2d 196, 197 (Ga. App. 1949)(noting in 
another FLSA case that “[b]ulletins seeking to construe the meaning of acts of Congress by Federal 
Administrative offices are not binding on this court. However, when such a bulletin conforms to the 
meaning which this court deems should properly be given such an act, it will be adopted.”) 
189 Id. at 225.  
190 Handel v. Powell, 670 S.E.2d 62, 63 (Ga. 2008). See also, Martin Wilson & Jennifer Blackburn, 
Administrative Law, 61 Mercer L. Rev. 1, 21-22 (2009). 
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rules are to be applied or what weight should be afforded to some rules as opposed to 
others. Finally, OCGA § 21-2-2(32) defines residence as meaning domicile.191  
Powell declared his candidacy for PSC District 4 and claimed residence in Towns 
County. Secretary of State Handel challenged his qualifications, asserting that he resided 
outside that district because he still enjoyed a homestead exemption on property he 
owned in Cobb County.192 One of the qualifications listed in OCGA § 21-2-217(a) is 
where the candidate has a homestead exemption.193  An ALJ  ruled that Powell had 
moved to Towns County with the intent to make it his home even though he still had the 
homestead exemption in Cobb County, outside District 4.194 The ALJ, guided by other 
statutory rules for determining residency in OCGA § 21-2-217(a), cited evidence that the 
candidate spent about 60% of his time in Towns County where he was attending church, 
paying taxes, had registered two cars, had registered to vote and had voted, owned and 
operated a boat, obtained his driver’s license, and was receiving some of his mail. 
Moreover, the candidate’s wife would be moving there upon her retirement from a job in 
Atlanta.195  
The Secretary of State reversed the ALJ’s ruling and asserted that the address in 
which a person has declared a homestead exemption is deemed to be that person’s 
residence. She asserted the exemption establishes an irrebuttable presumption of legal 
residence and domicile for all purposes.196 
                                                          
191 670 S.E.2d .at 63. 
192 Id. at 64. 
193 O.C.G.A. § 21-2-217(a)(14) (“The specific address in the county … in which a person has declared a 
homestead exemption, if a homestead exemption has been claimed, shall be deemed the person’s residence 
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194 Handel, 670 S.E.2d at 64. 
195 Id. at 64 n.2. 
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The Georgia Supreme Court said that the Secretary of State’s analysis of the 
pertinent statutes had the effect of elevating the homestead exemption rule in OCGA § 
21-2-217(a) above the remaining fourteen rules in that section, “effectively eviscerating 
their application in any case questioning the qualifications of a candidate for elective 
office should the candidate own a home on which a homestead exemption is enjoyed.”197 
The court applied the principle of interpretation that “[a] statute must be construed ‘to 
give sensible and intelligent effect to all [its] provisions and to refrain from any 
interpretation which renders any part of the statute meaningless.’”198 If the legislature had 
meant for the homestead exemption to be controlling in determining residency of a 
person running for elective office, it would have so stated in the statute.199 
 If this case had involved federal law and had been litigated in federal court,  then 
it is evident that the Georgia Supreme Court correctly stopped at Chevron step one – the 
relevant statutes were not ambiguous, the General Assembly’s intent was clear, and the 
agency charged with the administration of the statutes, here the Secretary of State, 
interpreted those statutes incorrectly.  The Secretary of State argued that the superior 
court was obligated to defer to her interpretation of these statutes since she was charged 
with enforcing them,200 but under these circumstances it would have been inappropriate 
to move to Chevron step two and consider whether she had interpreted and applied the 
statutes reasonably. After all, if the intent of the legislative branch is clear, “that is the 
                                                          
197 Id. at 66. 
198 Id.  quoting R.D. Brown Contractors, Inc. v. Bd. of Ed. of Columbia County, 626 S.E.2d 471, 474  (Ga. 
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199 Id. at 66. 
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end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent” of the legislature.201  
Of course, this was the Georgia Supreme Court, not the United States Supreme 
Court, and the Handel v. Powell opinion does not cite Chevron or any other decision 
from the federal courts. However, the Georgia Supreme Court had this to say about 
judicial deference:   
While judicial deference is afforded an agency’s interpretation of statutes it is 
charged with enforcing or administering, the agency’s interpretation is not 
binding on the courts, which have the ultimate authority to construe statutes. It is 
the role of the judicial branch to interpret the statutes enacted by the legislative 
branch and enforced by the executive branch, and administrative rulings will be 
adopted only when they conform to the meaning which the court deems should 
properly be given. The judicial branch ‘make[s] an independent determination as 
to whether the interpretation of the administrative agency correctly reflects the 
plain language of the statute and comports with the legislative intent.’202 
This statement can be seen as another way of expressing Chevron step one. If the intent 
of the legislature is clear that is the end of the matter; the courts and the agency must give 
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of the legislative branch.203 Moreover, the 
Georgia Supreme Court’s statement reads like an important footnote in Chevron that 
makes clear, in regard to step one, that “[t]he judiciary is the final authority on issues of 
                                                          
201 Chevron,  467 U.S. at 842-43. 
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statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to 
clear congressional intent.”204  
In addition, the Georgia Supreme Court, in construing the Georgia Code’s 
provision on determining a candidate’s residency, used a traditional tool of statutory 
construction to ascertain the General Assembly’s intent: it read the statute so as “to give 
sensible and intelligent effect to all of [its] provisions and to refrain from an 
interpretation which render[s] any part of the statute meaningless.”205 This is consistent 
with the U.S. Supreme Court’s explanation in that Chevron  footnote about how courts 
should approach step one; “[i]f a court, employing traditional tools of statutory 
construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, 
that intention is the law and must be given effect.”206 
 The Georgia Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Center for a Sustainable Coast v. 
Coastal Marshlands Protection Committee207 stands in contrast to the Pruitt decision in 
which the court stated it would not defer to an agency’s manual that had not been adopted 
as a regulation. In Center for a Sustainable Coast (CSC) the court held that judicial 
deference is properly afforded to an agency’s interpretation of its governing statute as 
contained in a properly promulgated regulation even when that regulation is promulgated 
while the underlying dispute is being litigated.208 However, the court’s discussion of 
deference might be regarded as dicta because it followed a de novo review of alleged 
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errors of law made by an ALJ regarding the agency’s jurisdiction.209 In addition, the fact 
the agency’s new regulation was promulgated while the ALJ’s contested ruling was being 
reviewed by the court of appeals seems to make agency action appear like a self-serving 
after-thought that should not be given much weight.210 Finally, two justices dissented, 
asserting that the court of appeals erred in granting review and in addressing the merits 
because there was not a final agency decision subject to review. This meant that the 
superior court arguably lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review the ALJ’s order.211 
Notwithstanding these red flags, the decision merits discussion. 
 The Coastal Marshes Protection Act212 (CMPA) authorizes the creation of the 
Coastal Marshes Protection Committee (the Committee) to consider permit applications 
in coastal marshlands.213 The Committee includes the Commissioner of Natural 
Resources and four other persons selected by the Board of Natural Resources.214 The 
Commissioner also supervises and executes the functions vested in the Department of 
Natural Resources and the Board is the policy-making and governing body of the 
Department.215  
The proceeding that led to the Supreme Court’s discussion of deference started 
with a residential developer’s application for a permit to construct docks and a marina on 
                                                          
209 Id.at 431-33. See also Coastal Marshlands Prot. Comm. v. Center for a Sustainable Coast, 649 S.E.2d 
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215 649 S.E.2d at 622 n.3 
 42
marshlands near St. Mary’s, Georgia.216 The Committee granted the permit subject to 
several conditions and the Center for a Sustainable Coast and other organizations 
challenged the permit on a number of grounds including the Committee’s failure to 
regulate the upland portions of the proposed development. An ALJ agreed with the 
Center and remanded the permit application to the Committee for additional 
consideration.217 The developer and the Committee sought immediate review and, after 
the ALJ’s decision was affirmed by operation of law due to a superior court’s failure to 
act in the time specified in the statute, the court of appeals granted a discretionary 
appeal.218 It ultimately held that the permitting power of the Committee did not extend to 
regulating the upland portions of the development.219   
The court of appeals conducted what appears to be a de novo review in 
concluding that “[n]othing in the CMPA … can be construed to require or authorize the 
Committee, as part of the permit application process, to consider or regulate any aspect of 
[the applicant’s] adjacent high land or upland residential development.”220 The 
construction of the CMPA sought by the CSC was “so broad that [the Committee] could 
regulate all storm water runoff generated by upland development” and this “far exceeds 
the legislature’s intended scope for the CMPA.”221 
 The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. The majority opinion quotes extensively 
from the court of appeals decision. Like that court, it devoted considerable attention to 
the meaning of the words “otherwise alter” in the governing statute and accepted use of 
the ‘ejusdem generis’ canon of statutory construction to define that phrase in the context 
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of the CMPA.222 The court stated that there was no ambiguity in the statute but that 
“considerable ambiguity would arise if the phrase ‘otherwise alter’ was given the reading 
the ALJ applied.”223 It pointed out that the ALJ’s reading would require an upland project 
located miles from marshlands to obtain a permit if it could be shown that storm water 
runoff might affect the marshes, and this would create an ambiguity when read with other 
provisions in the statute. The structure of the statute and its language showed that the 
legislature intended the Committee to have a more limited role than that asserted by CSC 
and the ALJ.224 
 The supreme court then turned attention to a Department of Natural Resources 
regulation that was issued while the litigation was pending.225 It did this because “it is 
particularly instructive to examine the interpretation of the CMPA adopted by the 
Department,” since interpretations of a statute by the agency which has the duty of 
enforcing it ordinarily are given “great weight and deference.”226 The court explained that 
it does not blindly follow the agency’s reading, but it does defer “when it reflects the 
meaning of the statute and comports with legislative intent.”227 In this case deference was 
particularly warranted because the General Assembly authorized the Department of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
220 649 S.E.2d at 627. 
221  Id. at 628. 
222 670 S.E.2d at 431-32. 
223 Id. at 432.  
224 Id. at 432-33. The court said that if an upland residential development was built without any structures 
being placed in the marshlands, no permit would be required and the development would be well beyond 
the purview of the Committee. Id. at 433.  
225 Id. at 433-34. The Center for a Sustainable Coast argued that the rule was adopted to influence the 
litigation so it was not a genuine interpretation. Id. at 434  n.4. The court noted that there was nothing in the 
record to support that contention and said it “will not declare an exception to the normal rules of deference 
merely because an administrative agency issues a rule or regulation at a time when there is a pending 
dispute regarding the subject of that rule or regulation.” Id. See also Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 
(2002) in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that a legislative rule the Social Security Administration 
adopted after the claimant’s case reached the courts was not too late to receive Chevron deference. In 
addition, the agency had long espoused the same interpretation in informal announcements. Id. at 221-22.   
226 CSC, 670 S.E.2d at at 433.  
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Natural Resources to determine jurisdiction under the CMPA, and the Department issued 
a rule that addressed the Committee’s jurisdiction to regulate upland areas.228 The court 
found that there was a reasonable statutory basis for the manner in which the Department 
construed its jurisdiction, there was no evidence that the Department acted arbitrarily to 
limit the Committee’s jurisdiction to less than what the legislature intended in the CMPA, 
and there was nothing in the statute showing a legislative intent for the Committee to be 
the ‘super regulator’ of all development on the Georgia coast.229 In reaching this 
conclusion the supreme court cited and quoted from the CMPA as well as the court of 
appeals opinion. 
It is interesting to note that in the Pruitt opinion the Georgia Supreme Court said 
that it was appropriate to defer to an “agency’s interpretation of rules and regulations it 
has enacted to fulfill the function given it by the legislative branch.”230 However, the 
court concluded that the court of appeals was wrong to give deference to DCH’s 
interpretation of the manual because it had not been adopted as a rule or regulation; the 
manual’s terms “had not undergone the scrutiny afforded a statute during the legislative 
process or the adoption process through which all rules and regulations must pass. See 
OCGA § 50-13-4.”231  In contrast, in Center for a Sustainable Coast the Department’s 
properly promulgated rule, defining the Committee’s limited jurisdiction to regulate 
                                                                                                                                                                             
227 Id. quoting  Schrenko v. DeKalb County School Dist., 582 S.E.2d 109, 114 (Ga. 2003). 
228 Id.at 433. 
229 Id. at  434. 
230 Pruitt Corp. v. Ga. Dep’t of Community Health,  664 S.E.2d at 225 quoting  The Atlanta Journal & 
Constitution v. Babush, 364 S.E.2d 560, 562 (Ga. 1988)(this was an open meetings case involving the State 
Personnel Board and that agency’s interpretation of the words ‘hearing’ and ‘review’ in its Rules – the 
Court said that in construing administrative rules, ‘the ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, 
which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the [rule]’quoting 
U.S. v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 872 (1977)) 
231 Pruitt, 664 S.E.2d at 225. The Georgia Supreme Court held in 1991 that a department publication with 
policies and procedures for nursing home services was not a ‘rule’ as defined in the Georgia APA. Georgia 
Department of Medical Assistance v. Beverly Enterprises, 401 S.E.2d 499 (Ga. 1991). 
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upland areas, was entitled to deference. After all, the General Assembly had authorized 
the agency to determine jurisdiction under the CMPA and the agency promulgated the 
rule.232 In Chevron terms, the court determined on step one that the CMPA did not define 
the Committee’s jurisdiction precisely so it was appropriate for the court to move to step 
two and defer to the agency’s reasonable interpretation of its jurisdiction over upland 
areas. In determining that the interpretation was reasonable, the court turned to traditional 
tools of statutory interpretation. 
 
D. Later Developments in Georgia’s Deference Jurisprudence 
1. Step One Decisions 
The Court of Appeals cited and quoted from Handel v. Powell in Georgia Power 
v. Georgia Public Service Commission, a 2009 decision overturning the PSC’s 
interpretation of the Georgia Territorial Service Act.233 The underlying dispute involved 
Georgia Power’s petition to the PSC to block Sumter EMC from providing electricity to 
two new office buildings in Georgia Power’s service area under what is termed a corridor 
right.234 Georgia Power asserted that the PSC and the superior court had fundamentally 
misinterpreted the controlling statute, OCGA § 46-3-4(4), and the court of appeals 
agreed.235 It noted that it generally deferred to the PSC’s interpretation of this statute but 
that deference is not absolute and then quoted from Handel that “administrative rulings 
                                                          
232 CSC, 670 S.E.2d at 434. The court found that there was a reasonable statutory basis for the manner in 
which the Department construed its jurisdiction, that there was no evidence that the Department acted 
arbitrarily to limit the Committee’s jurisdiction to less than what the legislature intended in the CMPA, and 
that there was nothing in the statute showing a legislative intent for the Committee to be the ‘super 
regulator’ of all development on the Georgia coast. 
233 675 S.E.2d 294, 297 (Ga. App. 2009). See also, Martin Wilson & Jennifer Blackburn,  Administrative 
Law, 61 Mercer L. Rev. 1, 25 (2009). 
234 675 S.E.2d at 296-97. 
235 Id.at 296. 
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will be adopted only when they conform to the meaning which the court deems should 
properly be given. The judicial branch makes an independent determination as to whether 
the interpretation of the administrative agency correctly reflects the plain language of the 
statute and comports with the legislative intent.”236 The court of appeals looked at the 
statute, said the legislation’s prefatory language shed light on when corridor rights arise, 
and followed the canon of reading the statute as a whole to conclude that the PSC 
misinterpreted and misapplied the statute.237  
The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the Court of Appeals had 
not erred in its interpretation of the statute.238 While acknowledging that the PSC’s 
interpretation of its statute is entitled to respect, it said “this case does not involve 
interpretation of a technical question necessary to the administration of the law. It simply 
requires a judicial determination as to whether the PSC correctly interpreted the plain 
meaning of the statute. We conclude that it did not.”239 In essence, these appellate courts 
stopped at step one. The statute was clear when read as a whole, and the agency’s 
interpretation of the statute was wrong so there was no deference.240  
                                                          
236 Id. at 297 quoting Handel v. Powell, 670 S.E.2d at 65.See also McLendon v. Advertising That Works, 
665 S.E.2d 370, 371(Ga. App. 2009) quoting Trent Tube  v. Hurston, 583 S.E.2d  198 (Ga. App. 
2003)(“erroneous applications of law to undisputed facts, as well as decisions based on erroneous theories 
of law, are subject to the de novo standard of review”).  
237 675 S.E.2d at 298. The specific canon is that language in one part of the statute must be interpreted in 
light of the legislature’s intent as found in the whole statute. Id. at 298 n.13 quoting Ins. Dep’t v. St. Paul 
Fire & Cas. Ins. Col, 559 S.E.2d 754, 756 (Ga. App. 2002)..  
238 Sumter Elec. Membership Corp. v. Georgia Power Co., 690 S.E.2d 607 (2010). See also, Martin Wilson 
& Jennifer Blackburn, Administrative Law, 62 Mercer L. Rev. 1, 18-19 (2010). 
239 690 S.E.2d at 608-09 (citations omitted).  
240 The Supreme Court quoted the statute’s corridor rights provision,  explained what the statute’s plain 
terms provide, and then explained how its reading of the statute was reinforced by considering the 
provision in context – looking at the entire statute. 690 S.E.2d at 608. Cf.  Ga. Dept. of Community Health 
v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Authority, 669 S.E.2d 233 (Ga. App. 2008)(no deference to DCH when hospitals 
challenged the retroactive application of DCH’s manual on reimbursements as unlawful during the 
administrative proceeding and then as unconstitutional on judicial review – the appellate court held it was 
appropriate for the superior court to rule that the agency was applying the manual in an unconstitutionally 
retroactive way and affirmed, rejecting the agency’s exhaustion argument). See also Martin Wilson & 
Jennifer Blackburn, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, Administrative Law, 61 Mercer L. Rev. 1, 20 (2009). 
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Similarly, the Court of Appeals, while repeating the familiar maxim about 
deference to an agency’s interpretation of the statute it enforces and citing Owens 
Corning, reversed the Department of Revenue’s interpretation of a statute allowing sales 
tax exemptions or refunds under certain circumstances.241 At issue in ChoicePoint 
Services v. Graham was the term “computer equipment” defined in the statute as “any 
individual computer or organized assembly of hardware or software.”242 The Department 
of Revenue, ruling against a refund request, said this definition did not include purchases 
by electronic means.243 The court of appeals said that it was not bound to blindly follow 
an agency’s interpretation of a statute, that the statutory language was clear, and that the 
Department’s interpretation did not reflect the statute’s plain language or the legislature’s 
intent.244 This was another step one case; the statute was clear and the agency’s 
construction was wrong so no deference was appropriate.245 
Carolina Tobacco Co. v. Baker is a step one case in which the Court of Appeals 
concluded that the agency – here the Attorney General – got it right in concluding that the 
term “tobacco product manufacturer, as defined by the General Assembly, was plain and 
unequivocal.246 The court analyzed the statute while adhering to rules of statutory 
construction, noted that because the term “manufactures” was not defined it should be 
                                                          
241 ChoicePoint Services, Inc. v. Graham, 699 S.E.2d 452 (Ga. App. 2010). The statute at issue, OCGA § 
48-8-3(68)(A) essentially allows certain companies to claim exemptions from or refunds of sales tax when 
they have purchased more $15 million in computer equipment in a calendar year.  
242242 699 S.E.2d at 254-55 citing and quoting from OCGA § 48-8-3(68)(C)(1).  
243 Id. at 255. 
244 Id. at 258. 
245 See also Georgia Soc. of Ambulatory Surgery Centers v. Georgia Department of Community Health, 
___ S.E.2d __ (Ga. App. 2011)(no deference to the agency in regard to a disputed information request as 
part of the agency ‘s annual survey because the request was too broad in seeking information that was 
beyond what was permitted by the statute’s plain and literal provision on health care information). 
246 670 S.E.2d 811 (Ga. App. 2008). The Attorney General had determined that Carolina Tobacco did not 
qualify as a “tobacco product manufacturer” under Georgia’s legislation implementing the master tobacco 
settlement because it outsourced the fabrication of its cigarettes overseas – it did not directly manufacture 
cigarettes as the legislature unambiguously intended. Id. at 813. 
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given its natural signification, referred to Black’s Law Dictionary, cited Webster’s for the 
definition of “directly,” and quoted the definition in the Attorney General’s 
regulations.247 After repeating the familiar language about deference to agency 
interpretations, the court stated that “even if ambiguity existed in the statute, we would 
defer to that AG’s interpretation as stated in the regulation.”248 This statement is arguably 
dicta because the statute’s meaning was plain and unambiguous, and the Attorney 
General construed it properly.  
 
2. Step Two Decisions 
In a 2009 decision, Morrison v. Claborn, the Court of Appeals cited Owens 
Corning when it upheld the Jasper County Board of Tax Assessor’s interpretation of the 
word “any” in the applicable statute.249 The court concluded that word’s meaning was not 
plain, and that the rules of statutory construction required it to adopt the Board’s 
interpretation because when there is ambiguity, tax statutes should be interpreted in favor 
of the tax, not the exemption.250 Here, a Chevron step two case, the court deferred to the 
agency’s reasonable interpretation of the ambiguous statutory term. 
In another step two decision the Court of Appeals deferred to the Judicial 
Retirement System’s interpretation of the statutory term ‘salary’ for purposes of 
                                                          
247 Id. at 814-15. 
248 Id. at 815. The court cited the Pruitt decision in support of its statement about deference. See also, 
Palmyra Park Hospital, 714 S.E.2d at 75 (citing Pruitt in support of its statement about deference), 
249 Morrison v. Claborn, 669 S.E.2d 392 (Ga. App. 2009). The applicable statute is OCGA § 48-5-7.4(b)(5).  
The underlying dispute was whether Morrison’s property could qualify as a bona fide conservation use 
property notwithstanding restrictive covenants that prevented him from conducting some of the activities 
listed in the statute. The Board said “any” meant “any one” of the listed activities while Morrison said 
“any” meant “all” so that his land qualified as conservation use property so long as the covenants did not 
prevent him from conducting “all” of the listed activities. 669 S.E.2d at 495. 
250 669 S.E.2d at 495 quoting  Owens Corning, 660 S.E.2d at 720. 
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calculating retirement benefits in McKelvey v. Georgia Retirement System.251 Salary is 
defined in the statute as the retiree’s “average earnable monthly compensation,” which is 
then defined as the “full rate of regular monthly compensation payable to a member 
employee for his or her full working time.”252 The claimant, a retired Solicitor General, 
argued that the agency improperly excluded from its calculations of his monthly 
compensation sums paid to him as reimbursement for administrative expenses he 
incurred as well as sums paid for health and dental insurance. The court acknowledged 
that “compensation” could be given an expansive interpretation but that based on the 
statute and its definitions, it was clear that the agency was authorized to exclude from 
‘salary’ sums paid as reimbursement for expenses and fringe benefits.253  The Court of 
Appeals recognized that pension statutes should be construed liberally and that that the 
JRS might have given construed the relevant code sections in a broader manner but it 
then repeated the familiar maxim about great deference to an agency’s interpretation of 
the statute it is charge with enforcing, and stated that the agency’s interpretation found 
support in the language of the legislation.254 
Citing both the Handel and Pruitt decisions, the Court of Appeals, in Northeast 
Georgia Medical Center v. Winder HMA, Inc., deferred to the Department of Community 
Health’s interpretation of and application of its own rules.255 This step two case involved 
a competitor’s challenge to the agency’s decision to award a certificate of need to the 
Northeast Georgia Medical Center to for a 100 bed hospital in southern Hall County. 
After concluding that the agency’s decision was based on substantial evidence, the court 
                                                          
251 678 S.E.2d 120  (Ga. App. 2009). 
252 Id. at 121 citing and quoting from OCGA §§ 47-23-1(1) and 1(9). 
253 Id. at 123. 
254 Id. 
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focused on the soundness of the conclusions of law.256 It explained deference was 
appropriate because agencies have expertise and can be much more specialized than 
courts and the legislature, and “in construing administrative rules, the ultimate criterion is 
the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it is plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the rule.”257  
In City of LaGrange v. Georgia Public Service Commission the court of appeals 
affirmed an agency decision that had approved a hearing officer’s ruling that an 
electricity provider other than the City of LaGrange could supply power to a school’s ball 
field and new auditorium.258 The basic issues in this step two case involved interpretation 
of a statute that assigns electrical power for new premises within particular geographic 
areas to particular suppliers, and whether Diverse Power Inc. (DPI) or the city should 
provide that power. The premises at issue were connected to Troup County High School 
and it was undisputed that the City of LaGrange had provided electrical service to the 
high school since 1987. There was testimony at the hearing about how and when the City 
learned about the school’s plans for the new auditorium and ball field, DPI’s involvement 
in these projects, whether or not these were expansions of existing facilities under the 
territorial electrical service act, and about the Troup County Board of Education’s 
                                                                                                                                                                             
255 693 S.E.2d 110,115-16 (Ga. App. 2010). See also Martin Wilson & Jennifer Blackburn, Administrative 
Law 62 Mercer L. Rev. 1, 13-14 (2010). 
256 Id. at 114 citing Handel v. Powell and Pruitt. 
257 Id. at 115 quoting from The Atlanta Journal v. Babush, 364 S.E.2d 560 (1988). See also, Palmyra Park 
Hospital v. Sumter Medical Center, 714 S.E.2d 71, 79 (Ga. App. 2011)(deference to the Department of 
Community Health’s grant of a certificate of need after concluding that the agency had not exceeded its 
authority in interpreting the governing statute). 
258 City of LaGrange v. Georgia Public Service Commission, 675 S.E.2d 525 (Ga. App. 2009)(the PSC 
decision had been affirmed by the superior court). See also, Martin Wilson & Jennifer Blackburn, 
Administrative Law, 61 Mercer L. Rev. 1, 11-12 (2009). 
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decision to award the contract to DPI instead of the City of LaGrange. The hearing 
officer ruled for DPI, the PSC affirmed, and the superior court affirmed.259 
The Georgia Court of Appeals, in affirming, repeated the familiar maxims 
regarding deference to the PSC’s enforcement and administration of its governing statute, 
and that its interpretations of that statute were entitled to great weight.260 Three code 
sections were at issue in regard electrical service for the new auditorium; one allowing a 
consumer to choose a different supplier where service is provided to one or more new 
premises, a grandfather clause that gives suppliers the exclusive right to continue service 
at premises already being served, and the statute’s definition of premises.261 The 
Commission, after, evaluating the evidence and assessing the credibility of witnesses, 
determined that the auditorium and the school were separate premises under the 
definition so the grandfather section did not apply and school was allowed to select DPI 
as its supplier instead of the City of LaGrange. The court of appeals said this decision 
was supported by the evidence and not arbitrary and capricious.262 In regard to the 
agency’s decision that DPI could continue to provide service for the ball field lights, the 
court agreed with the Commission’s interpretation of the governing legislation  that a 
code section pertaining to transfers of service did not apply to preclude DPI’s 
continuation of electrical service for the ball field. The court, in affirming, utilized 
traditional tools of statutory interpretation, followed the plain meaning of the statute’s 
language on continuations and transfers of service; assigned the statute’s words their 
ordinary, logical and common meanings; and read the sections on continuations and 
                                                          
259 675 S.E.2d  at 527-29. 
260 Id. at 529. 
261 Id. at 529 citing OCGA §§ 46-3-8(a), - 8(b) & -3(c).  
262 Id. at 529-30. 
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transfers in pari materia to reconcile them so that were consistent and harmonious with 
one another. It said that there was no merit to the City’s argument that the Code section 
on transfers applied.263  
   III. Georgia’s Tools of Statutory Interpretation 
There is some risk in generalizing about the Georgia judiciary’s strong, Chevron-
like deference to agency interpretations of the statutes they administer.  First, as 
explained in the introduction,264 it must be recognized that Georgia’s appellate courts 
have stated that “[j]udicial review of an administrative decision is a two-step process.”265  
In Georgia this means that the reviewing court first determines whether there is sufficient 
evidence to support the agency’s finding of fact and then, second, examines the 
soundness of the agency’s conclusions of law.266  The focus of this article, and its thesis 
about judicial deference in Georgia, is on what this state’s appellate courts have been 
doing on that second step when they review the agency’s interpretation of its governing 
statute. Second, there is no statement from either the Georgia Supreme Court or the 
Georgia Court of Appeals as clear as that key paragraph from Chevron announcing the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s two step approach. Third, just as some scholars have questioned 
how consistently the U.S. Supreme Court has applied Chevron,267 it is not always clear 
                                                          
263 Id. at 530. The court had to reconcile OCGA §§ 46-3-8(c)1 and 46-3-8(c)2. The first permits transfer of 
service if current service is inadequate, undependable or unreasonable and the latter permits transfer out of 
public convenience and necessity. 
264 See text and notes at notes 26 to 30 supra. 
265 Handel v. Powell, 670 S.E.2d 62, 65 (2008) (emphasis added); Lamar Co. v. Whiteway Neon-Ad, 693 
S.E.2d 848, 851 (Ga. App. 2010); Northeast Georgia Medical Center v. Winder HMA, Inc., 693 S.E.2d 
110, 114 (Ga. App. 2010).  
266 Pruitt Corp. v. Georgia Dept. of Community Health, 664 S.E.2d 223, 226 (2008). 
267 See, e.g., William Fox, supra note 7, at 316 discussing U.S. Supreme Court decisions that some regard 
as a retreat from Chevron deference.  
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whether Georgia’s appellate courts are consistently adhering to the judicial review 
standards announced in the many decisions which are discussed in this article.268  
       Nevertheless, based on the Georgia cases it is reasonable to conclude there is a 
two step approach to deference issues that parallels the Chevron two-step. Furthermore, 
the rationale or justifications for deference offered by Georgia’s appellate courts are the 
same as those offered by the U.S. Supreme Court in Chevron; respecting explicit and 
implicit legislative delegations of policy-making authority to agencies, appreciation of 
agency expertise and opportunity for agencies to specialize, and recognition that agencies 
are more political accountable than courts.269 
             A. The First Step in Georgia.  As a general matter Georgia courts look first to 
the plain language in the agency’s governing statute to determine whether it addresses the 
question at issue. If it does, and the agency read the statute correctly, then the agency 
should be affirmed assuming its application of the statute is reasonable. On the other 
hand, if the agency’s interpretation violates the plain language of the statute or is contrary 
to the statute’s clear meaning, then there is no deference and reversal is appropriate.270 In 
fact, in four of the nineteen cases which are discussed and analyzed in the text of this 
article, Georgia’s appellate courts stopped at this point, saying that the agency 
                                                          
268 This statement is supported by the fact that there are forceful dissenting opinions in many of the reported 
cases. See, e.g., the cases discussed at notes 130 to 166 supra.  
269 Compare Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-45 & 864-66 with Georgia Real Estate Commission v. Accelerated 
Courses in Real Estate, 214 S.E.2d 495, 500 (1975); Bentley v. Chastain, 249 S.E.2d 38, 40 (1978); 
Department of Community Health v. Gwinnett Hospital System, 586 S.E.2d 762, 765 (Ga. App. 2008); 
Northeast Georgia Med. Ctr. V. Winder HMA, Inc., 693 S.E.2d 110, 115 (Ga. App. 2010).  
270 Richard Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law 90 (2008)(“There is broad agreement that the plain meaning of 
the language of a statute can trump Chevron deference”). See, e.g., Georgia Power v. Georgia Public 
Service Commission, 675 S.E.2d 294, 297 (Ga. App. 2009(reading the statute as a whole, the court of 
appeals found it was clear, and concluded that the agency’s decision was wrong, so no deference); Dozier 
v. Hanes,  696 S.E.2d  503 (Ga. App. 2010)(“The first rule of statutory construction is to construe the 
statute to effectuate the intent of the legislature. To that end, ‘[w]here the language of a statute is plain and 
unambiguous, judicial construction is not only unnecessary[,] but forbidden’”quoting Wheeler County 
Board of Tax Assessors v. Gilder, 568 S.E.2d 786,  (Ga. App. 2002))  
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misconstrued plain and unambiguous language,271 or that it gave too much weight to one 
of a statute’s several terms.272 In another decision the Supreme Court stopped at step one 
and would not defer because the agency’s position was contained in a manual that had 
not been promulgated as a regulation,273 and in a sixth step one case there was no 
discussion of deference because the Court of Appeals concluded that the Attorney 
General had properly interpreted plain and unambiguous statutory terms.274  
 The explanations offered by Georgia’s appellate courts for what happens on this 
first step are familiar. “[E]rroneous applications of law to undisputed facts, as well as 
decisions based on erroneous theories of law, are subject to the de novo standard of 
review” under Georgia case law,275 and administrative rulings are “adopted only after the 
court has made an independent determination that they correctly reflect the meaning of 
the statute.”276 “[Georgia’s] judicial branch ‘make[s] an independent determination as to 
whether the interpretation of the administrative agency correctly reflects the plain 
language of the statute and comports with legislative intent.”277 If a statute’s language “is 
plain and susceptible of but one natural and reasonable construction, the court has no 
authority to place a different construction upon it, but must construe it according to its 
                                                          
271 Sawnee Electrical Membership Corp. v. Georgia Public Service Commission, 544 S.E.2d 158 (Ga. 
2001); Sumter Electrical Membership Corp. v. Georgia Power Co., 690 S.E.2d 607 (Ga. 2010); 
ChoicePoint Services v. Graham, 699 S.E.2d 452 (Ga. App. 2010). 
272 Handel v. Powell, 670 S.E.2d 62 (Ga. 2008). 
273 Pruitt Corporation v. Georgia Department of Community Health, 664 S.E.2d 223 (Ga. 2008). 
274 Carolina Tobacco Co. v. Baker, 670 S.E.2d 811 (Ga. App. 2008). 
275 McLendon v. Advertising That Works, 665 S.E.2d 370, 371 (Ga. App. 2008) quoting from Trent Tube 
v. Hurston, 583 S.E.2d 198 (Ga. App. 2003).   
276 Sawnee Electrical Membersip Corp. v. Georgia Public Service Commission, 544 S.E.2d 158, 163 (Ga. 
2001). 
277 Handel v. Powell, 670 S.E.2d 62, 65 (Ga. 2008). See also, Eagle West LLC v. Georgia Dep’t of Trans., 
__ S.E.2d __ , ___ (Ga. App. 2011)(the Department of Transportation’s interpretation of the statutory 
phrase “within 500 feet of an interchange” was affirmed with the court determining that “interchange” was 
not plain or unambiguous). 
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terms.”278 These statements are similar to the United States Supreme Court’s statement in 
Chevron regarding step one that “[t]he judiciary is the final authority on issues of 
statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to 
clear congressional intent.”279 If there is no ambiguity, the federal court decides 
independently whether the agency’s interpretation is in line with the statute’s meaning.280 
The first inquiry in Georgia’s approach to deference, like Chevron step one, 
leaves a great deal of judgment to the reviewing court.281 Georgia’s courts, like the 
federal courts, use traditional and established tools of statutory construction to ascertain 
whether the Georgia General Assembly had a clear intention on the question at issue. As 
just discussed, the courts first look to the language of the statute to determine its plain 
meaning. However, the statute’s text is often just a starting point, and it is difficult to say 
when the courts will go beyond the terms of the statute. For example, Georgia’s courts 
have also looked to the title of the legislation at issue as well as a statute’s preamble in 
order determine legislative purpose.282 The supreme court has said that the cardinal rule 
of statutory construction is to ascertain the legislature’s intent and purpose and then give 
                                                          
278 Lowry v. McDuffie, 496 S.E.2d 727, 730 (1998). See, e.g., Robinson v. Thurmond, 711 S.E.2d 430 (Ga. 
App. 2011)(the agency’s decision that the claimant had voluntarily quit and was thus ineligible for benefits 
was reversed because the court’s construction of several provisions in the statute made clear that an 
otherwise eligible claimant should not be deemed ineligible under the particular circumstances – this is 
another step one decision). 
279 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n. 9. See also Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 
480 U.S. 421 (1987) (rejecting an INS interpretation of immigration statute because it was contrary to clear 
legislative intent).   
280 See also NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 23, AFL-CIO, 484 U.S. 112, 123 
(1987). 
281 Asimow & Levin, supra note 6, at 534 note 4; Pierce, supra note 270, at 90 (some of the traditional 
tools of statutory interpretation are malleable and there is disagreement among judges about which ones are 
appropriate); Werhan, supra note 92, at 339 (the “eclectic approach to statutory interpretation at Chevron 
Step One has reintroduced a good measure of the analytical flexibility that had characterized the traditional 
Skidmore regime.”).  
282 Eason v.  Morrison, 182 S.E. 163, 164 (Ga. 1935). 
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the statute a construction that will effectuate that intent.283 A slight variation of this rule is 
called the golden rule of statutory construction: “to follow the literal language of the 
statute ‘unless is produces contradiction, absurdity or such an inconvenience as to insure 
that the legislature meant something else.”284 All of this is similar to what federal courts 
have done on Chevron step one; to read statutes in context, not in isolation, and to 
examine contested language in light of the entire statutory and regulatory scheme.285  
In particular, Georgia’s courts have stated the principle that a “statute must be 
construed to give sensible and intelligent effect to all [its] provisions and refrain from any 
interpretation which renders any part of the statute meaningless.”286 This statement was 
made in the context of the supreme court’s unanimous reversal in Handel v. Powell of the 
Secretary of State’s interpretation of a candidate eligibility statute. The erroneous 
interpretation made one qualification paramount and eviscerated the other fourteen 
rules.287 In another opinion the Georgia Court of Appeals stated a related principle of 
interpretation; that they have a duty to consider a statute’s “subsections in pari materia, 
and to reconcile them, if possible, so that they may be read as consistent and harmonious 
with one another.”288 Courts are to avoid constructions “that make some language mere 
surplusage.”289 Statutory exceptions are to be construed strictly and are to “be applied 
                                                          
283 Sawnee Electrical Membership Corp. v. Georgia Public Service Commission, 544 S.E.2d 158, 160 (Ga. 
2001); Palmyra Park Hospital, 714 S.E.2d 71, 77 (Ga. App. 2011). 
284 Georgia Department of Revenue v. Owens Corning, 660 S.E.2d 719, 722-23 (Ga. 2008)(dissenting 
opinion); cf. Center for a Sustainable Coast v. Coastal Marshlands Protection Committee, 670 S.E.2d 429, 
432-33 (Ga. 2008)(construing the statute as CSC wanted would have enabled the agency to regulate all 
storm water runoff generated by upland development far in excess of what the legislature intended).  
285 See, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000); Ragsdale v. 
Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 86 (2002); Werhan, supra note 92, at 338. 
286 Handel v. Powell, 670 S.E.2d 62, 66 (Ga. 2008). 
287 Id. at 66. See also, Eagle West LLC v. Georgia Dept. of Transp., __ S.E.2d ___ (Ga. App. 2011). 
288 City of LaGrange v. Georgia Power Co., 363 S.E.2d 286, 288 (Ga. App. 1987)(upholding the agency’s 
interpretation of the Territorial Service Act as reasonable and sensible). 
289 Blue Moon Cycle v. Jenkins, 642 S.E.2d 637 (2007). 
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only so far as their language fairly warrants.”290 A specific statute is to prevail over a 
general statute, absent a contrary legislative intent, to resolve any inconsistency between 
them.291 Both of Georgia’s appellate courts have used the ‘ejusdem generis’ canon of 
statutory construction in order to give clear meaning to statutory terms that might 
otherwise be regarded as ambiguous; the terms are read in the context of the rest of a 
governing statute.292 In addition, judges have turned to dictionaries to give meaning to 
terms left undefined in legislation,293 they have discussed legislative history,294 and they 
have analyzed how statutes have been amended by the General Assembly.295  
The approach of Georgia’s appellate courts to determine whether an agency’s 
governing statute is clear may not be as eclectic as the what has developed in the federal 
courts under Chevron step one for ascertaining ambiguity or clarity, but it just a matter of 
degree. Like the disagreements between justices on the U.S. Supreme Court seen in many 
of decisions with Chevron deference issues,296 what is a sensible reading of a governing 
statute according to some of Georgia’s justices and judges might be seen as wrong or 
thwarting legislative purposes according to other members of an appellate panel.297 This 
is evidenced in this article’s summaries of several decisions where Georgia’s appellate 
                                                          
290 Sawnee Elec. Membership Corp. v. Georgia PSC, 544 S.E.2d 158, 160 (2001). 
291 Ga. Mental Health Institute v. Brady, 436 S.E.2d 219, 221 (1993). 
292 Center for a Sustainable Coast v. Coastal Marshlands Protection Committee, 670 S.E.2d 429, 431-32 
(Ga.2008)(accepting use of this canon by the court of appeals to give unambiguous meaning to the terms 
“otherwise alter” in the context of the rest of the Coastal Management Protection Act).  
293 Sawnee Electrical Membership Corp. v. Georgia Public Service Commission, 544 S.E.2d 158, 160-61 
(Ga. 2001); Carolina Tobacco Co. v. Baker, 670 S.E.2d 811, (Ga. App. 2008)(turning to Black’s Law 
Dictionary and Webster’s for natural and ordinary signification of certain statutory terms). 
294 Georgia Department of Revenue v. Owens Corning, 660 S.E.2d 719, 720 (Ga. 2008). Legislative history 
of the Clean Air Act Amendments was critical in Chevron and the Supreme Court’s conclusion that 
‘stationary source’ was ambiguous. Werhan, supra note 92 , at 338. 
295 Owens Corning, 660 S.E.2d at 720-21(the supreme court discussed how Georgia’s sales and use taxes 
had evolved since 1951). 
296 See cases cited at note 50 supra. 
297 See, e.g., Owens Corning, 660 S.E.2d 719 (Ga. 2008) (three judge’s dissented and disagreed strongly 
with the majority’s reading of the statute). 
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judges were in sharp disagreement over the meaning of a statute and whether its terms 
were or were not ambiguous; the dissents often expressed strikingly different 
interpretations of the same governing statute.298  
B. Georgia’s Second Step. As a practical matter, the first step, where the 
governing statute’s clarity versus ambiguity is the central issue, is where a litigant 
challenging agency action will most likely win or lose. This is because once the court 
determines on step one that statutory terms are ambiguous deference comes into play and 
that, of course, favors the agency and its reasonable interpretation of the governing 
statute. This is exactly the way things have played out in the federal courts, with the 
agency winning the vast majority of the time when a U.S. Court of Appeals gets beyond 
step one.299   
With Georgia’s strong deference approach, it is very hard for a challenger to win 
on step two. In fact, in the thirteen cases discussed in the text of this article in which 
Georgia’s appellate courts got to the second step, the agency was affirmed.300 The courts 
state that they do not blindly follow the agency’s reading but, at the same time, they 
emphasize that agency interpretations are entitled to great weight and deference. The 
courts say they will defer when the interpretation reflects the meaning of the statute and 
                                                          
298 See, e.g., Sawnee  Electrical Membership Corp. v. Georgia Public Service Commission 544 S.E.2d 158 
(Ga. 2001)(majority feels statute unambiguous and reversed the agency while the dissent said there was 
ambiguity and deference was appropriate); City of LaGrange v. Georgia Power Co., 363 S.E.2d 286 (Ga. 
App. 2008)(majority affirms the agency’s interpretation and application of the statute while the dissenting 
judges asserted that the PSC had misconstrued plain, unambiguous language): Georgia Department of 
Revenue v. Owens Corning, 660 S.E.2d 719 (Ga. 2008)(the majority found the sales tax exemption statute 
ambiguous and deferred to the agency while the dissent contended that the exemption was clear and that the 
agency misconstrued the statute)   
299 See notes 34 and 86 supra and the articles and studies cited therein. 
300 The thirteen decisions I have categorized as step two cases are Eason (1935), Camp (1939), Belton 
(1972), Accelerated Real Estate (1975), Kelly (1985), City of LaGrange (1987), Gwinnett Hospital (2004), 
Owens Corning (2008), Center for a Sustainable Coast (2008), Claborn (2009), City of LaGrange (2009), 
McKelvy (2009), and Winder HMA (2010). 
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comports with legislative intent,301 and to determine reasonableness the Georgia courts 
sometimes ask whether the agency’s ruling or regulation is arbitrary and capricious.302   
Georgia’s courts, like the federal courts,303 turn to principles of statutory 
interpretation and canons of construction in making the determination of reasonableness, 
just as they do on the first step in determining whether a statute is clear or ambiguous. 
The familiar maxims about considering subsections in pari materia, reconciling them, 
and reading statutory provisions so they are consistent and harmonious with each other 
have been repeated by the courts while upholding an agency interpretation.304  
For instance, in Eason v. Morrison, a 1935 decision, the supreme court upheld 
regulations adopted by the State Board of Barber Examiners as reasonable.305 In reaching 
this decision the court examined the title of the acts and the preambles from both the 
original and amended versions of the statutes authorizing the Board to regulate barbers. It 
also noted the canon that laws protecting public health should be liberally construed, and 
observed that barbershops can be the source of infections.306 
Similarly, in the 2008 Center for a Sustainable Coast decision the supreme court 
said that a regulation promulgated by the Department of Natural Resources regarding the 
                                                          
301 Center for a Sustainable Coast v. Coastal Marshes Protection Act, 670 S.E.2d 429, 432-34 (Ga. 2008). 
See also, Eagle West LLC v. Georgia Dept. of Transp., __ S.E.2d __ (Ga. App. 2011)(since the word 
“interchange” in the statute was not modified by terms paved, planned, proposed or future, it was 
ambiguous, and DOT’s decision to deny a permit for erecting a billboard within 500 feet of a proposed 
interchange was reasonable). As explained earlier, supra at notes 34 and 61, reversals of agency action on 
step two of Chevron are much less frequent than reversals on step one. Still, federal courts have found 
agency action to be unreasonable on step two. See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Public Utilities Board, 525 
U.S. 366 (1999)(Court agrees that the governing statute is ambiguous but concludes that the agency’s rules 
were at odds with a reasonable interpretation of the statute).  
302 Georgia Real Estate Commission v. Accelerated Courses in Real Estate, 214 S.E.2d 495, 498 (1975) 
303 Werhan, supra note 92, at 340-41 discussing, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a 
Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995) and AT & T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S. 366 (1999). 
304 See, e.g., City of LaGrange v. Georgia Power Co., 363 S.E.2d 286, 288 (Ga. App. 1987)(Beasley, J. 
dissenting)(asserting that the agency has misconstrued plain, unambiguous language).  
305 182 S.E.163 (Ga. 1935).  
306 Id. at  165-66. 
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Coastal Marshes Protection Committee’s authority to regulate upland areas was 
reasonable; the manner in which the agency construed its jurisdiction was based on the 
governing statute, there was no evidence it acted arbitrarily to limit the committee’s 
jurisdiction to less than what the General Assembly intended, and nothing in the statute 
showed that the legislature wanted the agency to be a ‘super regulator.’307  
State v. Camp provides another example of the supreme court turning to canons of 
construction while deferring to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of its statute.308 The 
court, while noting a long accepted administrative interpretation of a tax statute, said that 
it would not construe statutes to produce an unreasonable or absurd result such as putting 
92% of inherited property into the highest tax bracket.309  It also said that ambiguous tax 
statutes should be construed in favor of citizens.310  
In the Owens Corning case, decided almost 60 years after Camp, the supreme 
court again upheld an agency’s interpretation of what the majority deemed to be an 
ambiguous exemption in a sales tax statute.311 However, in contrast to Camp the court 
said that in cases of ambiguity tax statutes are interpreted to favor the tax not the 
exemptions, that taxation is the rule and exemptions are the exception, and that 
exemptions must be clear and unambiguous in order to be valid.312 At the same time, the 
                                                          
307 Center for a Sustainable Coast v. Coastal Marshes Protection Committee, 670 S.E.2d 429, 433 (Ga. 
2008). See also, Palmyra Park Hospital v. Phoebe Sumter Medical Center, 714 S.E.2d 71, 79 (Ga. App. 
2011)(the court found that the Department of Community Health had not exceeded its authority in its 
interpretation of the governing statute). 
308 6 S.E.2d 299 (Ga. 1939).  
309 State v. Camp, 6 S.E.2d 299, 304 (1939) 
310 Id. Other decisions have said that pension laws should be liberally construed in favor of employees. 
McKelvey v. Ga. Judicial Ret. Sys., 678 S.E.2d 120, 123 (Ga. App. 2009)(citing several other decisions). 
311 Georgia Department of Revenue v. Owens Corning, 660 S.E.2d 719, 720 (Ga. 2008). 
312 Id.. See also Morrison v. Claborn, 669 S.E.2d 492, 495 (Ga. App. 2009). 
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dissent asserted that the tax statute was clear and unambiguous in providing the tax 
exemption and that the agency’s interpretation was in error.313  
In Kelly case, the supreme court relied on statistics in upholding as reasonable the 
Insurance Commissioner’s ruling that a particular kind of policy fell under a statutory 
filing exclusion. It was seen as a form “of unique character designed for … insurance 
upon a particular subject” – the coverage was unique because only 9 companies provided 
coverage for the 120 contractors in the state.314 
 The Georgia judiciary’s strong deference to agency interpretations of the statutes 
they administer is consistent with, and reinforced by, the judiciary’s considerable 
deference to agency findings of fact.  
Section 50-13-19(h) of Georgia’s Administrative Procedure Act provides: 
The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight 
of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the 
agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or 
modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced 
because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:  
(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;  
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;  
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;  
(4) Affected by other error of law;  
(5) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence 
on the whole record; or 
                                                          
313 Id. at 722-25. 
314 Kelly v. Lloyd’s of London, 336 S.E.2d 772, 774 (1985)(citing and discussing OCGA § 33-24-9(a)). 
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(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly 
unwarranted exercise of discretion.315  
 The clear statement in this section’s preamble that a court must not substitute its 
judgment for that of the agency on the weight of the evidence on questions of fact, and its 
explanation of the scope of review in subsection (5), have been interpreted to state the 
“any evidence” standard. Georgia’s appellate courts state repeatedly that the “superior 
court’s review of evidentiary issues is limited to determining whether factual findings are 
supported by ‘any evidence.’”316 This is a very deferential standard of review.  
Moreover, an appellate court’s duty “is not to review whether the record supports 
the superior court’s decision but whether the record supports the initial decision of the 
local governing body or administrative agency.”317 The court is to affirm if any evidence 
on the record substantiates the agency’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.318 The 
court gives “deference to the factual findings of the agency … [and] may reject those 
findings only if they are clearly erroneous in view of the reliable probative, and 
substantial evidence on the whole record; or arbitrary or capricious or characterized by an 
abuse of discretion of clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.”319 Decisions are not 
reviewed de novo.320  
                                                          
315 Ga. Code § 50-13-19(h)(emphasis added). 
316 Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia v. Hogan, 680 S.E.2d 518, 520 (Ga. App. 2009) 
citing Professional Standards Comm. v. Smith, 571 S.E.2d 443 (Ga. App. 2002). See also, DeKalb County 
v. Bull, 672 S.E.2d 500, 501 (Ga. App. 2009). 
317 Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia v. Hogan, 680 S.E.2d 518, 520 (Ga. App. 
2009).citing City of Atlanta Govt. v. Smith, 493 S.E.2d  51 (Ga. App. 2002). See also City of LaGrange v. 
Georgia Public Service Commission, 675 S.E.2d 525, 527 (Ga. App. 2009); Government of Athens-Clarke 
v. Public Service Commission, 668 S.E.2d 296, 297 (Ga. App. 2008); Robinson v. Thurmond, 711 S.E.2d 
430 (Ga. App. 2011).  
318  Government of Athens-Clarke v. Public Service Commission, 668 S.E.2d 296, 297 (Ga. App. 2008). 
319 City of LaGrange v. Georgia Public Service Commission, 675 S.E.2d 525, 527 (Ga. App. 2009). 
320 Id. citing Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Georgia Public Service Commission, 589 S.E.2d 292 (Ga. App. 2003).  
 63
This deference is explained by the fact that the person who has the duty of hearing 
the initial proceeding “is charged with weighing the evidence and judging the credibility 
of witnesses.”321 The superior court and the court of appeals are not allowed to re-weigh 
those credibility determinations.322 Accordingly, the superior court and the court of 
appeals “must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the factfinder’s decision 
and must affirm the decision is there is any evidence to support it, even when the party 
challenging the factfinder’s conclusions presented evidence during the initial proceedings 
that conflicted with those conclusions.”323 
  The relationship between the administrative law judge or hearing officer and the 
agency is important in regard to an appellate court’s review of an agency’s decision. The 
court of appeals has stated that an administrative law judge’s role at the hearing is to act 
as a representative of the agency and make a recommendation. The any evidence standard 
does not apply to an internal agency appeal; that is, the agency’s review of the ALJ’s 
decision. The board or commission can allow the ALJ’s recommendation to become the 
final decision (to affirm) or it can modify or reverse the appealed decision.324 The 
Georgia Administrative Procedure Act provides that in reviewing the initial decision of 
an ALJ the agency “shall have all the powers it would have [had] in making the initial 
decision and, if deemed advisable, the agency my take additional testimony or remand 
the case [to the ALJ for that purpose].”325 The agency must give due regard to the ALJ’s 
opportunity to observe witnesses and credibility assessments,326 but it is clear that 
                                                          
321 DeKalb County v. Bull, 672 S.E.2d 500, 501 (Ga. App. 2009) citing and quoting from Jamal v. 
Thurmond, 587 S.E.2d 809 (Ga. App. 2003). 
322 Id.  
323 DeKalb County v. Bull, 672 S.E.2d 500,  501 (Ga. App. 2009).  
324 Greene v. Dep’t of Community Health, 666 S.E.2d 590, 592 (Ga. App. 2008).  
325 Ga. Code § 50-13-17(a).  
326 See also Ga. Code § 50-13-41(d). 
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agencies, as the ultimate factfinders, are not bound by an ALJ’s findings and reviewing 
courts are not to reject an agency’s findings in favor of an ALJ’s findings.327 
     Conclusion 
 Georgia’s Supreme Court and Court of Appeals have often said that they defer to 
agency interpretations of the statutes that they are charged with administering and 
enforcing. These statements are not simply dicta. The many decisions discussed in this 
article support the proposition that Georgia is a strong deference jurisdiction. Moreover, 
these decisions also support my thesis that Georgia’s appellate courts have adopted and 
follow an approach to judicial deference that is similar to the United States Supreme 
Court’s Chevron two-step without having acknowledged that iconic decision in their 
opinions. Georgia’s strong deference jurisprudence pre-dates Chevron.  
On step one Georgia’s courts utilize traditional tools of statutory construction to 
determine whether the General Assembly has directly addressed the question at issue, and 
retain the ultimate authority to determine whether or not a statute is plain or ambiguous.  
In the event the statute is not clear or if the legislature’s intent is not evident in the 
governing statute then Georgia’s courts, on step two, determine whether the agency’s 
interpretation of the ambiguous statute is reasonable. This is where and when Georgia’s 
strong deference to the agency’s interpretation of its governing statute comes into play. In 
practice, this standard affords great weight to the agency’s determination.  The expressed 
rationale for Georgia’s strong deference parallels the rationale for deference that the U.S. 
Supreme Court offered in Chevron; respecting the legislature’s explicit and implicit  
delegation of policy making authority to agencies, acknowledging that agencies have  
                                                          
327 Greene v. Dep’t of Community Health, 666 S.E.2d 590, 592 (Ga. App. 2008). 
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expertise in particular areas of regulation and have the opportunity to specialize, and 
recognizing that overbroad review has the effect of substituting a court’s judgment for 
that of the agency thereby nullifying the benefits of the legislative delegation to the 
specialized body.328   
                                                          
328 Compare Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 & 865-66 
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